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I. Introduction

From border walls to travel bans to the import tax, President
Trump and his earlier electoral campaign have embraced policies
that evoke powerful geographical imageries.1 While the use of
these imageries have excited supporters and reminded them of the
president’s commitment to putting “America First,”2 it has also
raised considerable policy concerns while alarming the United
States’ neighbors in the north, the south, and across both oceans.3
1. See Jeremy Diamond & Steve Almasy, Trump’s Immigration Ban Sends
Shockwaves, CNN, http://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/28/politics/donald-trump-executiveorder-immigration-reaction/index.html (last updated Jan. 30, 2017, 12:34 PM) (last
visited Nov. 23, 2017) (reporting President Trump’s initial executive order
requiring the “extensive vetting” of citizens of seven Muslim majority countries
seeking to enter the United States) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Tal Kopan, Homeland Security Seeking Border Wall Proposals, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/24/politics/border-wall-prototypes-solicitation/ (last
updated Feb. 24, 2017, 3:44 PM) (last visited Nov. 23, 2017) (reporting the
Customs and Border Protection’s solicitation for proposals to design and build
several “prototype wall structures” near the U.S.-Mexico border) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Eric Martin, Why Trump’s “Big Border Tax”
Gets
Taken
Seriously:
Quick
Take
Q&A,
BLOOMBERG,
https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-01-18/why-trump-s-tariffthreats-get-taken-so-seriously-quicktake-q-a (last updated Mar. 1, 2017) (last
visited Nov. 23, 2017) (discussing the “border tax” proposed by President Trump
on the campaign trail) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. See Donald Trump, President of the United States, Inaugural Address in
Washington, D.C. (Jan. 20, 2017) (“From this day forward, a new vision will
govern our land. From this moment on, it’s going to be America First. Every
decision on trade, on taxes, on immigration, on foreign affairs, will be made to
benefit American workers and American families.”).
3. See Steve Benen, U.S. Allies Abroad Fear the Consequences of a Trump
Presidency, MSNBC (Jan. 17, 2017, 11:22 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/rachelmaddow-show/us-allies-abroad-fear-the-consequences-trump-presidency
(last
visited Nov. 23, 2017) (“Now that Trump is poised to take power, . . . anxiety and
mistrust among American allies has reached levels unseen in generations.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Michael Birnbaum, European
Leaders Shocked as Trump Slams NATO and E.U., Raising Fears of
Transatlantic
Split,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
16,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe-leaders-shocked-as-trump-slamsnato-eu-raising-fears-of-transatlantic-split/2017/01/16/82047072-dbe6-11e6-b2cfb67fe3285cbc_story.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2017) (“Trump’s attitudes have
raised alarm bells across Europe, which is facing a wave of elections this year in
which anti-immigrant, Euroskeptic leaders could gain power.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Michael Crowley, Foreign Policy
Experts Fret Over Trump’s America First Approach, POLITICO (Jan. 20, 2017, 3:52
PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/2017-trump-inauguration-foreignpolicy-reaction-233924 (last visited Nov. 23, 2017) (“President Donald Trump’s
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Regardless of one’s support for the current administration,
however, location-based policy discussions are likely to continue in
at least the next few years.
Coincidentally, there has been renewed scholarly, policy, and
popular attention to geographical studies and spatial analysis.
Having closed the Geography Department shortly after the Second
World War, Harvard University reentered this intellectual turf by
launching a new Center for Geographic Analysis in fall 2005.4 In
addition, the geographically based works of Jared Diamond and
Robert Kaplan have become New York Times bestsellers.5
Meanwhile, Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman successfully
introduced “new economic geography” through his academic and
popular works, bringing geography and international trade closer
to each other.6
inaugural address focused on an ‘America First’ approach that downgrades the
value of America’s global leadership and traditional alliances—a sharp break
with the internationalist vision of nearly every U.S. president of the past 100
years that troubled veteran foreign policy experts.”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
4. See Elizabeth Gehrman, Geography Center Launched, HARV. GAZETTE
(May
11,
2006),
http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2006/05.11/05geography.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2017) (reporting the launch of the Center
for Geographic Analysis at Harvard University) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); see also Hari M. Osofsky, A Law and Geography Perspective on
the New Haven School, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 421, 433–34 (2007) (“When Harvard
opened its Center for Geographic Analysis in 2006, its president, Lawrence
Summers, explicitly acknowledged this step as a reversal of its 1948 decision and
as ‘embracing the new geography.’”).
5. See generally JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL
OR SUCCEED (2011) [hereinafter DIAMOND, COLLAPSE] (recounting the success and
failure of societal responses to dramatic environmental changes); JARED DIAMOND,
GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES (1997) [hereinafter
DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL] (discussing how environmental conditions
have affected global developments more than what many believe); ROBERT D.
KAPLAN, THE REVENGE OF GEOGRAPHY: WHAT THE MAP TELLS US ABOUT COMING
CONFLICTS AND THE BATTLE AGAINST FATE (2012) (using maps, terrains, and other
geopolitical insights to shed light on ongoing and future global conflicts).
6. See generally Paul Krugman, Where in the World Is the New Economic
Geography, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY 49 (Gordon L.
Clark et al. eds., 2000) (discussing the goals, focus, and limitations of the subfield of “new economic geography”). Professor Krugman’s other works in this area
include MASAHISA FUJITA, PAUL KRUGMAN & ANTHONY J. VENABLES, THE SPATIAL
ECONOMY: CITIES, REGIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1999); PAUL KRUGMAN,
DEVELOPMENT, GEOGRAPHY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY (1997); PAUL KRUGMAN,
GEOGRAPHY AND TRADE (1991) [hereinafter KRUGMAN, GEOGRAPHY AND TRADE].
Professor Krugman is also a columnist for the New York Times, writing on
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Interestingly, although geography has had an important and
lasting impact on the development of intellectual property law and
policy—at both the domestic and international levels7—
geographical perspectives and spatial analysis have thus far not
attracted much attention from policymakers and commentators.
Only recently have we seen greater linkage between these two
undeniably connected fields.8 Even with such linkage, the
discussion tends to focus narrowly on specific issues, such as the
parallel importation of pharmaceuticals,9 the protection of
geographical indications,10 and the treatment of traditional
knowledge and traditional cultural expressions.11
Taking note of the limited interactions between intellectual
property and geography, this Article critically examines issues
lying at the intersection of these two interconnected fields. Part II
recounts how the post-war decline of academic geography in the
United States helps explain the limited role of geographical
insights and spatial analysis in law and policy debates.12 It further
explores the revival of geographical studies just as intellectual
property began to garner greater public attention in the 1980s and
the 1990s.13 Part III notes that geography has had a longstanding
and profound impact on the development of intellectual property
law and policy. For illustrative purposes, it discusses the principle
of territoriality,14 the doctrine of exhaustion of rights,15 the

macroeconomics, trade, and other topics. See The Opinion Pages: Paul Krugman,
N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/column/paul-krugman (last visited Nov. 23,
2017) (listing Professor Krugman’s opinion pieces) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
7. See infra Part III (discussing the longstanding impact of geography on
the development of intellectual property law and policy).
8. See infra notes 61–69 and accompanying text (discussing the growing
linkage between the fields of geography and intellectual property).
9. Infra Part III.B.
10. Infra Part III.C.
11. Infra Part IV.B.
12. Infra notes 23–36 and accompanying text.
13. Infra notes 37–69 and accompanying text.
14. Infra Part III.A.
15. Infra Part III.B.
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protection of geographical indications,16 and the establishment of
regional intellectual property norms.17
Part IV laments the inadequate use of geographical insights
and spatial analysis in the development of intellectual property
law and policy.18 It calls for a more geographically informed
analytical approach, which is especially well suited to addressing
the increasing complexities in intellectual property law and policy.
Part V outlines two approaches that can help improve the use of
geography in developing law and policy in this area.19 Focusing on
the dual notion of “spatializing law” and “legalizing space,” this
Part underscores the interconnectedness between law and
geography and brings readers full circle to the beginning of the
Article.
II. Law and Geography
Geography is an important subject that predates law, political
science, and many other humanities subjects that are now widely
studied in the United States.20 As Hari Osofsky described,
“[g]eography has ancient historical origins that trace to Greece,
Rome, North Africa, and Southwest Asia. The growth of
geographical thought in fifteenth and sixteenth century Europe,
which built on those traditions, was deeply intertwined with the
colonial project.”21 Utilizing maps, coordinates, scales, contour
lines, geological data, and aerial photographs, the study of
geography enables us to develop a better understanding of our
natural, political, social, and cultural environments.22
16. Infra Part III.C.
17. Infra Part III.D.
18. Infra Part IV.
19. Infra Part V.
20. See Osofsky, supra note 4, at 428 (“Geography had more of a presence in
the early years of elite U.S. educational institutions than did law.”).
21. Id.
22. See HARM DE BLIJ, WHY GEOGRAPHY MATTERS: THREE CHALLENGES
FACING AMERICA: CLIMATE CHANGE, THE RISE OF CHINA, AND GLOBAL TERRORISM 6
(2005) (“Geographers do research on glaciations and coastlines, on desert dunes
and limestone caves, on weather and climate, even on plants and animals. We
also study human activities, from city planning to boundary making, from wine
growing to churchgoing.”).
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Yet, as longstanding and beneficial as it is, academic
geography began to decline after the Second World War. In 1946,
Harvard University closed its Geography Department, with the
university president declaring that “geography is not a university
subject.”23 Other leading universities, such as the University of
Pennsylvania, Stanford University, and Yale University, soon
followed suit.24 While “[g]eography experienced a net loss of
thirty-two departments from 1970 to 1976, . . . in the mid-1980s,
Columbia, Northwestern, and the University of Chicago all closed
their departments.”25 Thus, in the late twentieth century, one often
has to go to public universities to study geography.26 Even worse,
“an American student [today] might go from kindergarten through
graduate school without ever taking a single course in geography—
let alone a fairly complete program.”27
Given the reduced opportunities to study geography, it is
understandable why Americans have been frequently, and often
harshly, criticized for their lack of basic geographical literacy.28 As
Harm de Blij lamented, “[a]t one Midwestern college, only 5
percent of the students could identify Vietnam on a world map. At
another college, only 42 percent correctly named Mexico as our

23. See Osofsky, supra note 4, at 430 (“In 1948, geography suffered what has
been characterized as a ‘terrible blow’ . . . from which ‘it has never completely
recovered.’ Not only did Harvard eliminate its geography department, but its
President, James Conant, issued a directive stating that ‘geography is not a
university subject.’”). For discussions of Harvard’s closure of its geography
department and the post-war decline of academic geography in the United States,
see generally id. at 427–34; Andrew F. Burghardt, On “Academic War Over the
Field of Geography,” The Elimination of Geography at Harvard, 1947–1951, 78
ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 144 (1988); Saul B. Cohen, Reflections on the
Elimination of Geography at Harvard, 1947–51, 78 ANNALS ASS’N AM.
GEOGRAPHERS 148 (1988); Neil Smith, “Academic War Over the Field of
Geography”: The Elimination of Geography at Harvard, 1947–1951, 77 ANNALS
ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 155 (1987).
24. See Osofsky, supra note 4, at 430 (noting that “the University of
Pennsylvania, Stanford, and Yale all closed their departments in the mid-1960s”).
25. Id.
26. See id. at 426 (stating that “66% of public doctoral/research universities
grant undergraduate geography degrees, while only 19% of private
doctoral/research universities grant them”).
27. DE BLIJ, supra note 22, at 13.
28. See id. at 16 (noting “an evident and worsening national geographic
illiteracy” in the United States).
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southern neighbor.”29 In his bestselling book, Why Geography
Matters, Professor de Blij included a story in which President
Ronald Reagan expressed pleasure to be in Bolivia when he was
actually speaking in Brazil.30 That book also recalled the
embarrassing moment when the staff of Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger confused Mauritius with Mauritania.31 As if these tidbits
and factoids were not enough, a hilarious, and simultaneously sad,
viral clip emerged a decade ago showing a Miss South Carolina
Teen struggling to explain why many Americans could not even
locate their home country on a world map.32 Shortly after the
Boston Marathon bombings, the Czech ambassador to the United
States also took pain to issue a statement reminding social media
users that the two suspects “actually traced their roots to
Chechnya, not the Czech Republic.”33
In an article providing a “law and geography” perspective on
the New Haven School of International Law,34 Professor Osofsky
carefully traced the decline of academic geography in the United
States.35 She further explained why such a decline had led to the
limited utilization of geographical insights and spatial analysis in
law school.36 Although her article focused on law school in general
29. Id. at 17.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 13 (quoting HENRY KISSINGER, YEARS OF RENEWAL 72 (1999)).
32. See Karen Thomas, That Wasn’t Miss South Carolina’s Final Answer,
USA
TODAY
(Aug.
28,
2007,
9:30
PM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/life/people/2007-08-28-miss-southcarolina_n.htm (last updated Aug. 28, 2007, 11:44 PM) (last visited Nov. 23, 2017)
(reporting about the viral clip) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
33. Charlie Campbell, Czech Republic Forced to Remind the Internet That
Chechnya Is in Different Country After Boston Bombing, TIME (Apr. 23, 2013),
http://newsfeed.time.com/2013/04/23/czech-republic-forced-to-remind-theinternet-that-chechnya-is-a-different-country-after-boston-bombing/ (last visited
Nov. 23, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Press
Release, Embassy of the Czech Republic in Washington, D.C., Statement of the
Ambassador of the Czech Republic on the Boston Terrorist Attack (Apr. 19, 2013)
(providing the ambassador’s statement).
34. Osofsky, supra note 4, at 427–34.
35. See id. (discussing the decline of academic geography in the United
States); see also THE ORIGINS OF ACADEMIC GEOGRAPHY IN THE UNITED STATES
(Brian W. Blouet & Teresa L. Stitcher eds., 1981) (providing an early history of
academic geography in the United States).
36. See Osofsky, supra note 4, at 426 (noting the striking “lack of overlap
between universities with geography departments and those with law schools
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and international law in particular, her observations are likely to
be applicable to intellectual property law as well. After all,
intellectual property is a rather young subject in law school and
did not begin to attract greater scholarly attention until the 1980s.
As I noted in an earlier article,
Intellectual property law was in the backwater only a few
decades ago. The Section on Intellectual Property Law of the
Association of American Law Schools . . . was not even founded
until the early 1980s, and the creation of intellectual property
specialty programs has been a recent phenomenon. As senior
legal scholars reminisced, early in their career, they would have
been lucky to find a school that would allow them to teach a
class on intellectual property law. Even if they were able to do
so, that “niche” class might very well have been the only one,
and the rest of their teaching duties would have been devoted
to other subject areas, such as property, contracts, or
commercial law.37

To make things more challenging, intellectual property law is
highly specialized and often practice oriented.38 As a result, it does
not lend itself immediately to interdisciplinary and
multidisciplinary research. Although historical and economic
analyses of intellectual property law and policy have been
published from time to time, efforts to link intellectual property to
other disciplines are mostly a recent phenomenon.39
that are top producers of new law teachers”); id. (noting that the siege of
geography as an academic discipline in U.S. universities in the mid-twentieth
century “has limited the educational exposure of current law professors to
geography”).
37. Peter K. Yu, Teaching International Intellectual Property Law, 52 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 923, 924 (2008).
38. See id. at 942 (describing the intellectual property law curriculum as
“specialized, and at times technical”).
39. See id. at 940 (noting that “the ‘law and . . .’ movement has finally spread
to international intellectual property law, and the subject has become
increasingly multidisciplinary”); see also Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property
Training and Education for Development, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 311, 328 (2012)
[B]ecause of the ever-expanding scope of intellectual property rights
and the ability for these rights to spill over into other areas of
international regulation, intellectual property training and
educational programs should feature inter- and multi-disciplinary
perspectives. Many of the existing programs focus primarily on the
legal aspects of intellectual property. However, it is increasingly
important to consider other aspects of intellectual property, such as
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Interestingly, and coincidentally, the study of geography
revived just as intellectual property began to garner greater public
attention in the 1980s and the 1990s.40 In the past two decades,
there have been many promising developments in the geographical
field. For example, Jared Diamond’s Pulitzer Prize-winning book,
Guns, Germs, and Steel,41 received considerable attention among
the popular audience. Focusing on “why . . . history unfold[ed]
differently on different continents,”42 this best-selling book
discussed how environmental conditions had affected global
developments more than what many believe.43 Specifically, it
explores how “[h]istory followed different courses for different
peoples because of differences among peoples’ environments, not
because of biological differences among peoples themselves.”44
More than a decade later, Professor Diamond provided a
follow-up to his earlier work by releasing Collapse.45 This book
recounted the success and failure of societal responses to dramatic
environmental changes, such as natural calamities, population
explosion, and rapid globalization.46 Drawing on observations from
both historic and modern societies, the book offered practical
lessons on how societies could better respond to future
environmental challenges.47
More recently, Robert Kaplan’s The Revenge of Geography,48
another New York Times bestseller, used maps, terrains, and other
geopolitical insights to shed light on ongoing and future global
conflicts.49 As this book noted in its opening, “[a] good place to
political, economic, social, and cultural.
(footnote omitted).
40. Cf. Osofsky, supra note 4, at 432 (“In the mid 1980s, interactions between
law and geography became more frequent. As geographers inquired into how and
why geographical context matters, legal scholars explored the implications of ‘law
and economics, critical legal studies, feminist legal theory, law and literature, and
critical race theory’ during this period.” (footnote omitted)).
41. See generally DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL, supra note 5.
42. Id. at 9.
43. Id. at 33–401.
44. Id. at 25.
45. See generally DIAMOND, COLLAPSE, supra note 5.
46. Id. at 27–416.
47. Id. at 419–525.
48. See generally KAPLAN, supra note 5.
49. Id. at 3–346.
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understand the present, and to ask questions about the future, is
on the ground, traveling as slowly as possible.”50 In the author’s
view, “[g]eography is the backdrop to human history itself. In spite
of cartographic distortions, it can be as revealing about a
government’s long-range intentions as its secret councils. A state’s
position on the map is the first thing that defines it, more than its
governing philosophy even.”51
Apart from Diamond and Kaplan, Nobel Laureate Paul
Krugman has pioneered research on what he coined “new economic
geography,” a subfield in geography that brings together
geography and international trade.52 As he explained,
The goal of the new economic geography . . . is to devise a
modeling approach—a story-telling machine—that lets one
discuss things like the economics of New York in the context of
the whole economy: that is, in general equilibrium. It should
allow us to talk simultaneously about the centripetal forces that
pull economic activity together, and the centrifugal forces that
push it apart—indeed, it should let us tell stories about how the
geographical structure of an economy is shaped by the tension
between these forces. And it should explain these forces in
terms of more fundamental, micro decisions.53

Within the legal field, Nicholas Blomley, David Delaney,
Richard Ford, and their colleagues—on both sides of the Atlantic
and beyond—have worked tirelessly for more than a decade to
develop the subfield of critical legal geography.54 As Professor
Blomley observed, “critical legal scholars . . . argu[e] that law is,
first and foremost, socially constituted and politically charged, so
critical geographers have argued for space as fundamentally

50. Id. at xiii.
51. Id. at 28.
52. See generally Krugman, supra note 6 (discussing the goals, focus, and
limitations of the sub-field of “new economic geography”).
53. Id. at 50–51.
54. See generally NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES
OF POWER (1994); DAVID DELANEY, RACE, PLACE, AND THE LAW, 1836–1948 (1998);
DAVID DELANEY, THE SPATIAL, THE LEGAL AND THE PRAGMATICS OF WORLD-MAKING:
NOMOSPHERIC INVESTIGATIONS (2010); THE EXPANDING SPACES OF LAW: A TIMELY
LEGAL GEOGRAPHY (Irus Braverman et al. eds., 2014) [hereinafter EXPANDING
SPACES OF LAW]; THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER: LAW, POWER, AND SPACE
(Nicholas Blomley et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER].
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social.”55 Even if one does not take a critical stand, bringing
together law and geography makes a lot of sense, especially for
those embracing the “law and society”56 or “law in context”
approach.57 As Jane Holder and Carolyn Harrison declared in their
introduction to Law and Geography,
Context is everything. The conviction that law can properly be
understood only by reference to its place in, and relationship to,
social, economic, political, and ecological systems underpins
contemporary critical and socio-legal scholarship. As such it
conjures up a powerful challenge to approaches to law which
idealize law’s separateness, rationality, and reflexivity, and
which portray law as deaf to material, physical, spatial, and
cultural influences. [Law and geography] reflects a contextual
approach, but prioritizes the geographical—territory, region,
locality, and place—over other “contexts” for good reasons, the
very least of which is the paucity of research conducted
self-consciously under the “Law and Geography” banner.58

In the past two decades, one can find additional scholarly
literature, usually critical scholarship, exploring issues at the
intersection of law and geography.59 As Irus Braverman, Nicholas
55. BLOMLEY, supra note 54, at 42.
56. Notably, the Law and Society Association includes a Collaborative
Research Network on Legal Geography, organized by Professors David Delaney
and Alexandre Kedar. See generally Collaborative Research Networks, LAW &
SOC’Y ASS’N, http://www.lawandsociety.org/crn.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2017)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
57. See Jane Holder & Carolyn Harrison, Connecting Law and Geography,
in LAW AND GEOGRAPHY 3, 3 (Jane Holder & Carolyn Harrison eds., 2003)
(discussing the contextual approach used in law and geography); Graeme B.
Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Territory: Detaching Trademark Law from the
Nation-State, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 885, 892 (2004) (“Law is contextual, and
geography is an important part of context.”).
58. Holder & Carolyn Harrison, supra note 57.
59. See generally LAUREN BENTON, A SEARCH FOR SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND
GEOGRAPHY IN EUROPEAN EMPIRES, 1400–1900 (2010) (examining the Europeans’
historical efforts in projecting sovereignty into distant territories and the spatial
variations and jurisdictional complexities under their imperial rule); THE
GEOGRAPHY OF LAW: LANDSCAPE, IDENTITY AND REGULATION (William Taylor ed.,
2006) (collecting articles discussing the law’s relationship with notions of space,
representations of landscapes, and concerns for individual identity and
autonomy); LAW AND GEOGRAPHY, supra note 57 (collecting articles exploring the
relationship between law and geography); SPATIALIZING LAW: AN
ANTHROPOLOGICAL GEOGRAPHY OF LAW IN SOCIETY (Franz von Benda-Beckmann
et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter SPATIALIZING LAW] (collecting articles studying how
law constructs spaces in different socio-political, legal, and ecological settings).
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Blomley, David Delaney, and Alexandre Kedar noted in the
introduction to their latest book, The Expanding Spaces of Law,
Legal geography is a stream of scholarship that makes the
interconnections between law and spatiality, and especially
their reciprocal construction, into core objects of inquiry. Legal
geographers contend that in the world of lived social relations
and experience, aspects of the social that are analytically
identified as either legal or spatial are conjoined and
co-constituted. Legal geographers note that nearly every aspect
of law is located, takes places, is in motion, or has some spatial
frame of reference. In other words, law is always “worlded” in
some way. Likewise, social spaces, lived places, and landscapes
are inscribed with legal significance. Distinctively legal forms
of meaning are projected onto every segment of the physical
world. These meanings are open to interpretation and may
become caught up in a range of legal practices. Such fragments
of a socially segmented world—the where of law—are not simply
the insert sites of law but are inextricably implicated in how law
happens.60

Even in the much narrower field of intellectual property,
discussions on the intersection of this specialized area of law and
geography have slowly emerged. For instance, in September 2010,
the International Society for the History and Theory of Intellectual
Property, known affectionately by its acronym “ISHTIP,” entitled
its second workshop “Geographies of Intellectual Property.”61 In
March 2013, the Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study
of Law, Culture and the Humanities included a panel on
“Intellectual Property and Geography,”62 which I organized. A year
later, the WIPO Journal devoted the special issue in its sixth
volume to intellectual property and geography.63 In September
2017, the 12th Annual Meeting of the European Policy for
60. Irus Braverman et al., Introduction to EXPANDING SPACES OF LAW, supra
note 54, at 1.
61. See
generally
2010
Events,
AM.
U.
WASH.
C.
L.,
https://www.wcl.american.edu/impact/ initiatives-programs/pijip/events/2010-events
(last visited Nov. 23, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
62. ASS’N FOR THE STUDY OF LAW, CULTURE & THE HUMANITIES, SCULPTING
THE HUMAN: LAW, CULTURE AND BIOPOLITICS: CONFERENCE PROGRAMME 91–93
(2013),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/520cce1ae4b08c3424a3ec6e/t/
5757389a8a65e29530505644/1465333919483/2013+Program.pdf.
63. See generally Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property Geographies, 6 WIPO J.
1 (2014).
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Intellectual Property Association at the University of Bordeaux in
France focused on the theme of “Claims on Area: The Geography–
IP Interface.”64
Vigilant observers may even notice that works linking the two
interconnected fields already slowly emerged in intellectual
property literature about two decades ago. Notable pioneering
works include those written by the late Keith Aoki65 and Rosemary
Coombe,66 both of whom participated in the historic Stanford Law
Review symposium on “Surveying Law and Borders” in February
1996.67 Also included in this symposium were articles exploring the
interactions between physical and cyber spaces by David Johnson
and David Post and by Lawrence Lessig.68 In addition, since the
mid-1990s a growing volume of geographically related works has
surfaced in the fields of cyberlaw and intellectual property law.69
Taken together, all of these scholarly endeavors in the field of
geography and in the crossover fields of law and geography and,
later, intellectual property and geography have suggested that the
64. Claims on Area: The Geography-IP Interface, EPIP 2017 CONF.,
http://epip2017.org (last visited Nov. 23, 2017) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
65. See generally Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes
Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (1996)
(criticizing the current maps of intellectual property law and policy and
highlighting the changing geographies of the information age); Margaret Chon,
Notes on a Geography of Global Intellectual Property, 6 WIPO J. 16 (2014)
(discussing Professor Aoki’s contributions to intellectual property and
geography).
66. See Rosemary J. Coombe, Authorial Cartographies: Mapping Proprietary
Borders in a Less-than-Brave New World, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1357, 1358 (1996)
(commenting on Professor Aoki’s article).
67. See Symposium, Surveying Law and Borders, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1037,
1040 (1996) (collecting articles discussing the geographic nature of legal
development).
68. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law
in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1367 (1996) (arguing that the new
boundaries of Cyberspace will lead to the creation of new laws and legal
institutions); see also Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV.
1403, 1403 (1996) (commenting on Professors Johnson and Post’s article).
69. See generally WILLIAM J. MITCHELL, CITY OF BITS: SPACE, PLACE, AND THE
INFOBAHN (1995); Anupam Chander, Law and the Geography of Cyberspace, 6
WIPO J. 99 (2014); Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
210 (2007); Michael J. Madison, Notes on a Geography of Knowledge, 77 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2039 (2009); Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital Public Domain:
Threats and Opportunities, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (2003).
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timing is ripe to inject geographical insights and spatial analysis
into intellectual property law and policy. Not only will such
injection introduce fresh perspectives and methodologies, but it
will also raise important conceptual and theoretical questions,
such as those concerning the principle of territoriality, the doctrine
of international exhaustion, and the notion of geographical
indications. The greater use of spatial analysis will also allow us
to call into question the many geographical assumptions that have
been consciously and subconsciously built into intellectual
property law and policy.
III. A Longstanding Link
Geography has a longstanding and profound impact on the
development of intellectual property law and policy, which can be
traced back more than two centuries. In the United States, the
Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution70 and the first
set of laws71 that Congress enacted based on the power enumerated
by that clause were all adopted at a time when the country was
slowly expanding beyond the then newly independent colonies. It
is no coincidence that the Copyright Act of 1790, the first federal
U.S. copyright statute, focused its protection on maps in addition
to charts and books.72 Indeed, publishers and printers at that time
did not need federal copyright protection until new transportation
methods and communication technologies had enabled markets to
expand geographically beyond their home states.73
70. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”).
71. See Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (providing the first federal
patent law); Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (providing the first federal
copyright law).
72. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, (granting protection to
“maps, charts, and books”).
73. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 271–72 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The States cannot separately make effectual provision for
either of the cases, and most of them have anticipated the decision of this point,
by laws passed at the instance of Congress.”); see also Barbara Ringer, Two
Hundred Years of American Copyright Law, in AM. BAR ASS’N, 200 YEARS OF
ENGLISH AND AMERICAN PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW 117, 124 (1977)
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At the international level, the need to establish new and
distant markets also accelerated the development of intellectual
property law and policy. As Paul Geller recounted, “[i]n the
nineteenth century, the industrial revolution increased the
production of hard goods. Better transport, starting with the
railway and steam ships, enabled these goods to be distributed
across longer distances.”74 Yet, when these goods were reproduced
without authorization—in the right holders’ home states or in
foreign states—the pirated products threatened to undercut their
returns on investments.75 These products would make it difficult
for right holders to continue their original production cycles.76 As
Stephen Ladas noted in relation to inventions, “no country [at that
time] could expect to satisfy the claims and protect the interests of
its own people in the sphere of industrial property without
securing protection on an international level.”77
Thus, when the two early international intellectual property
agreements—the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property78 (Paris Convention) and the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works79 (Berne Convention)—
were established, they were heavily influenced by contemporary
geopolitics. The rights granted were accordingly territorial in
nature and scope.80 Because the negotiations surrounding the
(noting “the fundamental difficulties of intercolonial transportation and
communication”).
74. Paul Edward Geller, Copyright History and the Future: What’s Culture
Got to Do with It?, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 209, 229 (2000).
75. See id. (noting that the “power of new media increased [the] risks of
piracy”).
76. See id. (“Culture industries . . . had to secure returns on their
investments to continue production cycles.”).
77. STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS:
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 12 (1975).
78. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20,
1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967)
[hereinafter Paris Convention].
79. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept.
9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (revised at Paris July 24, 1971) [hereinafter Berne
Convention].
80. See id. art. 5(3) (“Protection in the country of origin is governed by
domestic law.”); Paris Convention, supra note 78, art. 4bis(1) (“Patents applied
for . . . by nationals of countries of the Union shall be independent of patents
obtained for the same invention in other countries . . . .”).
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Paris and Berne Conventions involved mostly European colonial
powers with very limited participation from other parts of the
world81—most of which were still under colonial rule—these two
foundational conventions focused primarily on issues that were
important to European powers.82 In retrospect, this narrow focus
explains why many important questions about the protection of
genetic resources, traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural
expressions have not been actively explored until about two
decades ago.83
Today, geography continues to play a very important role in
intellectual property law and policy. Among the current issues that
can benefit from geographical insights and spatial analysis are the
protection of geographical indications,84 traditional knowledge,
81. The twelve countries that participated in the final conference on
September 6, 1886, approving the Berne Convention were Belgium, France,
Germany, Haiti, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Spain, Switzerland, Tunisia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, with Japan and the United States participating
as only observers. Sam Ricketson, The Birth of the Berne Union, 11 COLUM.-VLA
J.L. & ARTS 9, 29 (1986). The eleven countries that participated in the conference
on March 20, 1883 approving the Convention were Belgium, Brazil, France,
Guatemala, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Salvador, Serbia, Spain, and
Switzerland. LADAS, supra note 77, at 67.
82. The original Berne Convention, for example, provided merely minimum
protection for translation and public performance rights. See Sam Ricketson &
Jane C. Ginsburg, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE
BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 76–81 (2d ed. 2005) (discussing the original draft
of the Berne Convention); see also Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the
International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 339 (2004)
(discussing the original Berne Convention).
83. See infra notes 251–252 and accompanying text (discussing the recent
effort of the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore of the World Intellectual Property
Organization); see generally PROTECTING TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: THE WIPO
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENETIC
RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE (Daniel F. Robinson et al.
eds., 2017) (providing a detailed analysis of the Intergovernmental Committee’s
effort).
84. For book-length discussions of geographical indications, see generally
TESHAGER W. DAGNE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE IN
THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY: TRANSLATING GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS FOR
DEVELOPMENT (2014); DEV GANGJEE, RELOCATING THE LAW OF GEOGRAPHICAL
INDICATIONS (2015); GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS OF TRADE,
DEVELOPMENT, AND CULTURE: FOCUS ON ASIA-PACIFIC (Irene Calboli & Ng-Loy Wee
Loon eds., 2017) [hereinafter GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS];
THE PROTECTION OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE (Michael
Blakeney ed., 2014); RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
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and traditional cultural expressions;85 the discussions on
intellectual property and climate change;86 the development of
high-technology innovation clusters;87 the negotiation of regional
GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS (Dev S. Gangjee ed., 2016) [hereinafter RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS]; THE IMPORTANCE OF PLACE:
GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS AS A TOOL FOR LOCAL AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
(William van Caenegem & Jen Cleary eds., 2017) [hereinafter IMPORTANCE OF
PLACE].
85. For book-length treatments on traditional knowledge and traditional
cultural expressions, see generally JANE E. ANDERSON, LAW, KNOWLEDGE,
CULTURE: THE PRODUCTION OF INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW (2009); MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? (2003);
JONATHAN CURCI, THE PROTECTION OF BIODIVERSITY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2010); PETER DRAHOS,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND THEIR KNOWLEDGE (2014);
GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, BIOGENETIC RESOURCES AND
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE (2004); GENETIC RESOURCES AND TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE: CASE STUDIES AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS (Tania Bubela and E.
Richard Gold eds., 2013); INDIGENOUS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH (Matthew Rimmer ed., 2015) [hereinafter INDIGENOUS
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY]; INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ INNOVATION: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY PATHWAYS TO DEVELOPMENT (Peter Drahos & Susy Frankel eds., 2012);
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRADITIONAL CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS IN A DIGITAL
ENVIRONMENT (Christoph Beat Graber & Mira Burri-Nenova eds., 2008);
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN INDIGENOUS AND CULTURAL HERITAGE: LEGAL AND POLICY
ISSUES (Christophe B. Graber et al. eds., 2013); IKECHI MGBEOJI, GLOBAL
BIOPIRACY: PATENTS, PLANTS, AND INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE (2006); CHIDI
OGUAMANAM, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, PLANT BIODIVERSITY, AND TRADITIONAL MEDICINE (2006); TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE, TRADITIONAL CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION (Christoph Antons eds., 2009); DAPHNE
ZOGRAFOS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRADITIONAL CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS
(2010). For the Author’s earlier discussion in the area, see generally Peter K. Yu,
Cultural Relics, Intellectual Property, and Intangible Heritage, 81 TEMP. L. REV.
433 (2008) [hereinafter Yu, Cultural Relics]; Peter K. Yu, Traditional Knowledge,
Intellectual Property, and Indigenous Culture: An Introduction, 11 CARDOZO J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 239 (2003) [hereinafter Yu, Traditional Knowledge].
86. For book-length treatments on intellectual property and climate change,
see generally ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGIES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
CLIMATE CHANGE: ACCESSING, OBTAINING AND PROTECTING (Abbe E.L. Brown ed.,
2013); RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CLIMATE CHANGE
(Joshua D. Sarnoff ed., 2016); MATTHEW RIMMER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
CLIMATE CHANGE: INVENTING CLEAN TECHNOLOGIES (2011); ZHUANG WEI,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE: INTERPRETING THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND TECHNOLOGIES (2017).
87. See generally Kyle Bergquist et al., Identifying and Ranking the World’s
Largest Clusters of Inventive Activity, in THE GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2017:
INNOVATION FEEDING THE WORLD 161 (Soumitra Dutta et al. eds., 2017) (ranking
the world’s largest innovation clusters); HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON INNOVATION
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and plurilateral trade agreements;88 the challenges posed by
cloud-based platforms and transnational distribution;89 the use of

CLUSTERS: CASES AND POLICIES (Charlie Karlsson ed., 2008) (collecting
articles on innovation clusters); ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE:
CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994) (providing a
comparative study on the innovation clusters in Silicon Valley and on Route 128);
Camilla A. Hrdy, Cluster Competition, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 981 (2016)
(discussing regional cluster competition in relation to national innovation policy).
88. See generally REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM
(Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2006) (collecting articles discussing
regional trade agreements in relation to the World Trade Organization). For the
Author’s discussions of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, see generally
Peter K. Yu, The Alphabet Soup of Transborder Intellectual Property
Enforcement, 60 DRAKE L. REV. DISCOURSE 16, 24–28 (2012) [hereinafter Yu,
Alphabet Soup]; Peter K. Yu, Investor-State Dispute Settlement and the
Trans-Pacific Partnership, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE JUDICIARY
(Christophe Geiger ed., forthcoming 2018); Peter K. Yu, Thinking About the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (and a Mega-regional Agreement on Life Support), 21
SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) [hereinafter Yu, Thinking About
TPP]; Peter K. Yu, TPP and Trans-Pacific Perplexities, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
1129 (2014) [hereinafter Yu, TPP and Trans-Pacific Perplexities]; Peter K. Yu,
TPP, RCEP and the Crossvergence of Asian Intellectual Property Standards, in
GOVERNING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE MEGA-REGIONALS: REGULATORY
DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE (Peng Shin-yi et al. eds., forthcoming 2018)
[hereinafter Yu, TPP, RCEP and Crossvergence]; Peter K. Yu, TPP, RCEP and
the Future of Copyright Normsetting in the Asia-Pacific, in MAKING COPYRIGHT
WORK FOR THE ASIAN PACIFIC? JUXTAPOSING HARMONISATION WITH FLEXIBILITY
(Susan Corbett & Jessica Lai eds., forthcoming 2018) [hereinafter Yu, TPP, RCEP
and Copyright Normsetting].
89. For discussions of the legal challenges posed by cloud technology, see
generally CLOUD COMPUTING LAW (Christopher Millard ed., 2013); PRIVACY AND
LEGAL ISSUES IN CLOUD COMPUTING (Anne S.Y. Cheung & Rolf H. Weber eds.,
2015).
AND
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geolocation and geocircumvention tools,90 and the mining of data
involved in Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation.91
Apart from these current issues, geographical insights and
spatial analysis can be instrumental in analyzing past issues that
have now been resolved. A case in point is the past failure to treat
foreign knowledge or art as prior art in U.S. patent law.92 Such a
geographical limitation was particularly problematic from the
standpoint of protecting traditional knowledge and traditional
cultural expressions.93 Fortunately, this limitation has since been
90. For discussions of geolocation and geocircumvention tools, see generally
Kevin F. King, Geolocation and Federalism on the Internet: Cutting Internet
Gambling’s Gordian Knot, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 41 (2010); Kevin F.
King, Personal Jurisdiction, Internet Commerce, and Privacy: The Pervasive Legal
Consequences of Modern Geolocation Technologies, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 61
(2011); Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Geo-Location Technologies and Other Means of
Placing Borders on the “Borderless” Internet, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO.
L. 101 (2004); Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, How Does the Accuracy of Geo-Location
Technologies Affect the Law, 2 MASARYK U. J.L. & TECH. 11, 20 (2008); Marketa
Trimble, The Future of Cybertravel: Legal Implications of the Evasion of
Geolocation, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 567 (2012); Jerusha
Burnett, Note, Geographically Restricted Streaming Content and Evasion of
Geolocation: The Applicability of the Copyright Anticircumvention Rules, 19 MICH.
TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 461 (2013).
91. See generally Teresa Scassa & D.R. Fraser Taylor, Intellectual Property
Law and Geospatial Information: Some Challenges, 6 WIPO J. 79 (2014)
(examining the role of intellectual property law in shaping spatial data
infrastructures).
92. For the exchange between Margo Bagley and Craig Nard on this issue,
see generally Margo A. Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional: The Geographical
Limitation on Prior Art in a Small World, 87 MINN. L. REV. 679 (2003) [hereinafter
Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional]; Craig Allen Nard, In Defense of Geographic
Disparity, 88 MINN. L. REV. 222 (2003); Margo A. Bagley, Still Patently
Unconstitutional: A Reply to Professor Nard, 88 MINN. L. REV. 239 (2003).
93. See Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional, supra note 92, at 680 (“[The]
geographical limitation [of Section 102 of the U.S. Patent Act] is particularly
problematic with respect to public knowledge or use of inventions in developing
countries.”); see also Gillian N. Rattray, The Enola Bean Patent Controversy:
Biopiracy, Novelty and Fish-and-Chips, 2002 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 8, at 2–4
(discussing the controversy surrounding the issuance of a patent and a plant
variety protection certificate in the United States to the Enola variety of yellow
beans that originated from Mexico). As Professor Bagley continued,
The geographical limitation is problematic from the . . . policy
standpoint in three different scenarios. First, it allows third parties to
patent information publicly known or used in a foreign country even
though they were not aware of the earlier knowledge or use. Second, it
facilitates violations of § 102(f) by making it easier for third parties to
patent derived information from foreign sources that they did not
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removed following the adoption of the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act,94 the current patent statute.
The limited scope and length of this Article do not allow for a
detailed examination of all of the issues identified earlier. This
Part therefore focuses only on four areas of intellectual property
law and policy that have a direct connection to geography: (1) the
principle of territoriality; (2) the doctrine of exhaustion of rights;
(3) the protection of geographical indications; and (4) the
establishment of regional intellectual property norms.
A. The Principle of Territoriality
Territoriality is the bedrock principle of the intellectual
property system, whether the protection concerns copyrights,
patents, trademarks, or other forms of intellectual property
rights.95 This principle not only carefully identifies the prescriptive
jurisdiction, but also helps set boundaries for protection within and
outside the country.96 Strongly supported by the principle of
national sovereignty, the territoriality principle aims to address
concerns about international comity.97
themselves invent. Lastly, it allows inventors to make and use their
inventions in foreign countries for a potentially unlimited period of
time before filing for a U.S. application as long as the inventions are
not otherwise patented or described in a printed publication.
Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional, supra note 92, at 728.
94. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of
35 U.S.C.).
95. See Berne Convention, supra note 79, art. 5(3) (“Protection in the country
of origin is governed by domestic law.”); Paris Convention, supra note 78, art.
4bis(1) (“Patents applied for . . . by nationals of a country of the Union shall be
independent of patents obtained for the same invention in other countries . . . .”);
General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health ¶ 6(i), 43 I.L.M. 509, 511 (2004) (noting “the
territorial nature of the patent rights”).
96. See Marketa Trimble, Advancing National Intellectual Property Policies
in a Transnational Context, 74 MD. L. REV. 203, 205 (2015) (noting the two types
of issues concerning the cross-border aspects of intellectual property litigation—
namely, “establishing the territorial scope of substantive [intellectual property]
laws on the one hand and designing and applying conflict of laws rules in
[intellectual property] cases on the other”).
97. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (noting that
the territoriality principle “serves to protect against unintended clashes between
our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord”).
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A good illustration of the territoriality principle concerns the
protection of trademarks. In the United States, the protection
granted is based initially on use98 and, later, also on an intent to
use.99 As a result of the historical focus on trademark use, a
trademark can be used concurrently in different parts of the
country.100 Even after the trademark has been registered for
nationwide protection under the Lanham Act, the federal
trademark statute, the senior user can still continue to use the
mark based on prior use.101 That senior user can also extend the
use within the mark’s “zone of natural expansion.”102
The oft-cited historic precedent illustrating the territoriality
of trademark rights is United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus
Co.,103 a dispute between a Massachusetts plaintiff and a Kentucky
See generally Dinwoodie, supra note 57, at 887–88 (discussing the principle of
territoriality in the trademark context).
98. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012) (“The owner of a trademark used in
commerce may request registration of its trademark on the principal register
hereby established . . . .”); see also Sengoku Works Ltd. v. RMC Int’l, Ltd., 96 F.3d
1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 1996) (“It is axiomatic in trademark law that the standard
test of ownership is priority of use.”).
99. See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat.
3935 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (2012)) (amending the
Lanham Act by allowing anyone “who has a bona fide intention . . . to use a
trademark in commerce” to apply for registration).
100. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2012):
[C]oncurrent registrations may be issued to such persons when they
have become entitled to use such marks as a result of their concurrent
lawful use in commerce . . . . Concurrent registrations may also be
issued by the Director when a court of competent jurisdiction has
finally determined that more than one person is entitled to use the
same or similar marks in commerce.
101. See Sengoku Works, 96 F.3d at 1219 (“To acquire ownership of a
trademark it is not enough to have . . . registered it first; the party claiming
ownership must have been the first to actually use the mark in the sale of goods
or services.”).
102. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 420 (1916)
(refraining from passing judgment on “a case where the junior appropriation of a
trademark is occupying territory that would probably be reached by the prior user
in the natural expansion of his trade”); see also Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Cmty. Coll.
Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1027–29 (11th Cir. 1989) (listing the criteria for determining
the “zone of natural expansion”). But see beef & brew, inc. v. BEEF & BREW,
INC., 389 F. Supp. 179, 185 (D. Or. 1974) (“[T]he zone of expansion doctrine has
a more than usually unclear place in the law of unfair competition. This is so
because the doctrine is more than usually imprecise and yet very powerful.”).
103. 248 U.S. 90 (1918).
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defendant. The former started using the mark for its medical
product in Haverhill, Massachusetts in 1877 but did not sell the
product in Louisville until 1912, when the case was filed.104
Meanwhile, the latter and its predecessor had been using the mark
for another medical product in Louisville without the knowledge of
the former’s mark since 1883, about three decades before the case
was filed.105 As the Court declared, “petitioner, being the newcomer
in that market, must enter it subject to whatever rights had
previously been acquired there in good faith by the Rectanus
Company and its predecessor.”106
While the early court decisions concerning the territoriality
principle focused on concurrent or conflicting use at the domestic
level, the arrival of products with well-known trademarks from
abroad has raised important questions about conflicting use at the
international level. One of the earliest cases in this area is Person’s
Co. v. Christman,107 which is included in many trademark
casebooks and has continued to be taught widely in U.S. law
schools.108 In that case, although Christman used in commerce the
mark of a Japanese senior user, the court found for the American
defendant, holding that his “adoption and use of the mark [without
prior knowledge that the plaintiff intended to expand into the
United States] were in good faith.”109 As the court explained,
Christman’s adoption of the mark occurred at a time when
appellant had not yet entered U.S. commerce; therefore, no
prior user was in place to give Christman notice of appellant’s
potential U.S. rights. Christman’s conduct in appropriating and
using appellant’s mark in a market where he believed the
Japanese manufacturer did not compete can hardly be
considered unscrupulous commercial conduct.110

Taken together, United Drug and Person’s illustrate well the
territoriality principle that governs the protection of trademarks—
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 94–95.
Id.
Id. at 101.
900 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
See, e.g., GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION: LAW AND POLICY 424–28 (4th ed. 2012) (including the case
in the section on “The Territorial Nature of U.S. Trademark Rights”).
109. Person’s, 900 F.2d at 1570.
110. Id.
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and, by extension, other forms of intellectual property rights. The
courts’ discussions of this principle not only cover the boundaries
of the protection granted to relevant right holders, but they also
highlight the complications concerning the extraterritorial
protection of intellectual property rights.
B. The Doctrine of Exhaustion of Rights
Building on the territoriality principle is the debate on the
international exhaustion of rights—and, by extension, the
allowance of parallel importation.111 In its essence, the doctrine of
exhaustion of rights prevents an intellectual property right holder
from exerting control over the future distribution of a lawfully
purchased copy of the protected work.112 As the United States
Supreme Court reminded us a few years ago, the first-sale doctrine
in U.S. copyright law can be traced back to “the common law’s
refusal to permit restraints on the alienation of chattels.”113 In a
recent decision, the Court also noted that “[p]atent exhaustion, too,
has its roots in the antipathy toward restraints on alienation.”114
When international goods are involved, the debate tends to
turn toward the right holder’s ability to exert control beyond the
national border over the future distribution of a lawfully
purchased copy. In a country allowing for international
111. “Parallel importation” refers to the importation of (often cheaper) foreign
goods without the authorization of local copyright holders. For discussions of
parallel imports, see generally Margreth Barrett, The United States’ Doctrine of
Exhaustion: Parallel Imports of Patented Goods, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 911 (2000); Carl
Baudenbacher, Trademark Law and Parallel Imports in a Globalized World—
Recent Developments in Europe with Special Regard to the Legal Situation in the
United States, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 645 (1999); Shubha Ghosh, An Economic
Analysis of the Common Control Exception to Gray Market Exclusion, 15 U. PA. J.
INT’L BUS. L. 373 (1994); Shubha Ghosh, Gray Markets in Cyberspace, 7 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 1 (1999); Seth Lipner, Trademarked Goods and Their Gray Market
Equivalents: Should Product Differences Result in the Barring of Unauthorized
Goods from the U.S. Markets?, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1029 (1990).
112. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1355 (2013)
(stating that the exhaustion-of-right doctrine holds that “once a copy . . . has been
lawfully sold (or its ownership otherwise lawfully transferred), the buyer of that
copy and subsequent owners are free to dispose of it as they wish”).
113. Id. at 1363.
114. Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1527
(2017).
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exhaustion—such as Israel, New Zealand, Singapore,115 and to
some extent Australia116—a product can be freely distributed
within the country once it has been lawfully purchased in any part
of the world.117 By contrast, in a country allowing for only national
exhaustion, the product cannot be freely distributed within the
country unless a lawful purchase has been made in that country.118
Although the United States used to be a jurisdiction with a
national-exhaustion regime,119 its laws have changed considerably
115. See Susy Frankel & Daniel J. Gervais, International Intellectual Property
Rules and Parallel Imports, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
EXHAUSTION AND PARALLEL IMPORTS 85, 102–04 (Irene Calboli & Edward Lee eds.,
2016) (discussing the international-exhaustion regimes in Israel, New Zealand,
and Singapore).
116. See id. at 104 (“Australia generally applies a rule of national exhaustion.
After much debate, restrictions on parallel imports of computer programs and
sound recordings were removed to allow parallel imports, but print music and
books cannot be parallel imported.”).
117. As Frederick Abbott explained,
There are three distinct geographic concepts of exhaustion and parallel
importation: national, regional and international. Under a “national”
exhaustion policy, the [intellectual property] holder’s right to exclude
is only extinguished when the good or service is put onto the market in
the national territory. There are no “parallel imports” permitted.
Under a “regional” exhaustion policy, the [intellectual property]
holder’s right is extinguished when a good or service is put onto the
market within any country of a defined region, such as the European
Union. “Parallel imports” are permitted, but only with respect to goods
first placed on the market within the regional territory. Under an
“international” exhaustion policy, the [intellectual property right]
holder’s right is extinguished when a good or service is put onto the
market anywhere in the world. “Parallel imports” are permitted with
respect to goods or services lawfully first placed on the market
anywhere in the world.
FREDERICK M. ABBOTT, PARALLEL IMPORTATION: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL WELFARE
DIMENSIONS 5 (2007), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/parallel_importation.pdf; see
also Irene Calboli, Market Integration and (the Limits of) the First Sale Rule in
North American and European Trademark Law, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1241,
1256–58 (2011) (explaining the differences between national, international, and
regional exhaustion); Ryan L. Vinelli, Note, Bringing down the Walls: How
Technology Is Being Used to Thwart Parallel Importers amid the International
Confusion Concerning Exhaustion of Rights, 17 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 135,
148–51 (2009) (discussing the three major exhaustion regimes).
118. See ABBOTT, supra note 117, at 5 (discussing national exhaustion).
119. See Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1373 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that
“the United States has steadfastly resisted [the movement for ‘international
exhaustion’ of copyrights] on the world stage”).
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in the past few years. In the 2013 case of Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley
& Sons,120 the United States Supreme Court confirmed the
application of the first-sale doctrine in U.S. copyright law to copies
of copyrighted works lawfully made within the United States and
abroad.121 Kirtsaeng concerned the distribution within the United
States of foreign-made English-language editions of U.S.
textbooks, which the defendant acquired from family and friends
through purchases made in Thailand.122 As the Court reasoned,
“[b]oth historical and contemporary statutory context indicate that
Congress, when writing the present version of § 109(a) [of the U.S.
Copyright Act], did not have geography in mind.”123
Most recently, in Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark
International, Inc.,124 the Court further extended its international
exhaustion position to the patent context. Impression Products
concerned the potential patent infringement caused by the
refurbishment, resale, and importation of patent-protected printer
toner cartridges that have originally been sold abroad under an
express restriction on the purchaser’s right to reuse or resell the
product.125 In this case, the Court held that “a patentee’s decision
to sell a product exhausts all of its patent rights in that item,
regardless of any restrictions the patentee purports to impose or
the location of the sale.”126
If one is willing to go further, one will find the Court’s much
earlier acceptance of international exhaustion in the trademark
context in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.127 Issued in 1988, that case
concerned the U.S. Customs Service’s ability to permit the
importation of certain gray-market goods.128 Under current U.S.
120. 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
121. See id. at 1355–56 (holding that “the ‘first sale’ doctrine applies to copies
of a copyrighted work lawfully made abroad”); see also Quality King Distribs., Inc.
v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 145 (1998) (stating that the first sale
doctrine applies to copies of a copyrighted work initially manufactured in the
United States and then sold abroad).
122. See Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1352.
123. Id. at 1360.
124. 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017).
125. Id. at 1529–31.
126. Id. at 1529.
127. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 287–88 (1988).
128. See id. at 285 (concerning “whether the Secretary of the Treasury’s
regulation permitting the importation of certain gray-market goods is a
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law, trademark owners are unable to prevent such importation
unless the imported goods “are ‘materially different’ from the goods
that are sold in the United States with the trademark owner’s
consent.”129
The United States’ recent completion of its transition to an
international-exhaustion regime in all three main branches of
intellectual property rights is important because members of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) have historically disagreed over
the appropriate international standard concerning the exhaustion
of intellectual property rights. During the negotiations on the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights130 (TRIPS Agreement), developed and developing countries
failed to reach a consensus on this important standard. While the
United States and the European Communities (now the European
Union) favored national or regional exhaustion, Australia, Hong
Kong, New Zealand, and Singapore preferred international
exhaustion.131 In the end, as Vincent Chiappetta recounted,
countries had no choice but to “agree to disagree” over the

reasonable agency interpretation of § 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930”).
129. Mary LaFrance, A Material World: Using Trademark Law to Override
Copyright’s First Sale Rule for Imported Copies, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 43, 56 (2014). As Professor LaFrance explained,
[I]f the goods in question are “materially different” from the goods that
are sold in the United States with the trademark owner’s consent,
consumers may be confused or misled about the nature or quality of
the goods bearing the trademark. If consumers are disappointed in the
goods because they do not possess the expected characteristics,
consumers will blame the trademark owner for the discrepancy. Thus,
the consumer’s confusion can undermine the good will associated with
the trademark, thereby damaging the mark and causing injury to the
trademark owner. Accordingly, materially different goods that are
legitimately marked with the same designation but designed for sale
in different geographic areas are considered to be non-genuine.
Id. at 56–57.
130. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
131. See Jayashree Watal, From Punta del Este to Doha and Beyond: Lessons
from the TRIPS Negotiating Processes, 3 WIPO J. 24, 26 (2011) (“[S]ome
Commonwealth members, Hong Kong, China, Singapore, New Zealand and
Australia, took the initiative on the exclusion of the subject of parallel trade from
dispute settlement, thus retaining the pre-existing flexibility on differing national
policies” (footnote omitted)).
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exhaustion issue.132 As a result, Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement
neither mandates nor forbids international exhaustion.133 Instead,
it merely states that the mandatory WTO dispute settlement
process will not be “used to address the issue of the exhaustion of
intellectual property rights.”134
In recent years, the debate on international exhaustion has
become even more complicated with the active negotiation of
bilateral, regional, and plurilateral trade agreements.135 Often
included in these agreements are provisions seeking to reduce the
ability of a signatory to maintain its exhaustion regime. A case in
point is Article 15.5.2 of the United States–Morocco Free Trade
Agreement,136 which provides,
Each Party shall provide to authors, performers, and producers
of phonograms the right to authorize or prohibit the importation
into that Party’s territory of copies of the work, performance, or
phonogram that are made without authorization, or made
outside that Party’s territory with the authorization of the
author, performer, or producer of the phonogram.137
132. See generally Vincent Chiappetta, The Desirability of Agreeing to
Disagree: The WTO, TRIPs, International IPR Exhaustion and a Few Other
Things, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 333 (2000).
133. See TRIPS Agreement art. 6 (“[N]othing in this Agreement shall be used
to address the issue of exhaustion of intellectual property rights.”).
134. Id.
135. See generally Robert Burrell & Kimberlee Weatherall, Exporting
Controversy? Reactions to the Copyright Provisions of the U.S. Australia Free
Trade Agreement: Lessons for U.S. Trade Policy, 2008 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y
259 (criticizing the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement); Yu, supra note 82, at
392–400 (discussing the growing use of bilateral and regional trade agreements
to push for higher intellectual property standards); INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS (Christopher Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders
eds., 2007) (collecting articles discussing free trade agreements (FTAs) in the
intellectual-property context).
136. Final Text, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/morocco-fta/final-text. (last visited Dec. 6,
2017) (showing and providing links to the United States–Morocco Free Trade
Agreement, U.S. Morocco, June 15, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
137. See id. (showing art. 15.5.2). Nevertheless, the agreement was
accompanied by a side letter on Article 15.5, which provides,
With respect to copies of works and phonograms that have been placed
on the market by the relevant right holder, the obligations described
in Article 15.5.2 apply only to books, journals, sheet music, sound
recordings, computer programs, and audio and visual works (i.e.,
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Notwithstanding this ongoing development, the increasingly
globalized marketplace and the multijurisdictional nature of acts
involving the Internet have caused the exhaustion debate to
change slowly—not just in the United States but also in other parts
of the world. A few years ago, the European Commission launched
the “Licences for Europe” Stakeholder Dialogue, which prioritized
the “cross-border portability of subscription services.”138 At his
welcoming address at the 2013 General Assembly, Francis Gurry,
the director general of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), also noted the importance of creating “a
seamless global digital marketplace.”139 Such a transborder
marketplace could be quite promising for disseminating online and
cloud content.140
In addition, legal commentators have considered the
national-exhaustion approach outdated. As William Patry wrote,
There should be worldwide exhaustion of digital rights once a
work has been licensed in one country. National or regional
exhaustion is a relic of the analog world. Societies should be
required to maintain free, publicly accessible online databases
of which works they claim the right to administer, as well as
categories of products in which the value of the copyrighted material
represents substantially all of the value of the product).
Notwithstanding the foregoing, each Party may provide the protection
described in Article 15.5.2 to a broader range of goods.
Letter from Taib Fassi Fihri, Minister Delegate for Foreign Affairs and
Cooperation, to Robert B. Zoellick, U.S. Trade Rep. (June 15, 2004),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/morocco/asset_upload_
file717_3850.pdf.
138. EUR. COMM’N, LICENCES FOR EUROPE: TEN PLEDGES TO BRING MORE
CONTENT ONLINE 3–4 (2013), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/
licences-for-europe/131113_ten-pledges_en.pdf.
139. 2013 Address by the Director General, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/dgo/speeches/a_51_dg_speech.html
(last
visited Nov. 23, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
140. See Peter K. Yu, A Seamless Global Digital Marketplace of Media and
Entertainment Content, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
MEDIA AND ENTERTAINMENT 265, 277–89 (Megan Richardson & Sam Ricketson
eds., 2017) [hereinafter Yu, Seamless Global Digital Marketplace] (calling for the
establishment of “a seamless global digital marketplace” of media and
entertainment content); Peter K. Yu, Towards the Seamless Global Distribution
of Cloud Content, in PRIVACY AND LEGAL ISSUES IN CLOUD COMPUTING, supra note
89, at 180, 199–212 [hereinafter Yu, Towards Seamless Global Distribution]
(identifying five areas in which adjustments can be introduced to promote the
seamless global distribution of cloud content).
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contact information for the rights holders sufficient to permit
users to contact the rights holders directly. There should be
legally required fixed time periods to distribute monies,
especially for foreign rights holders. If foreign money is not
distributed within the requisite time period, the foreign rights
holder or the home society of the rights holders may bring suit
and are entitled to attorney’s fees and penalties.141

There is also a burgeoning literature exploring ways to update the
exhaustion-of-right doctrine to meet the ever-evolving needs of the
digital environment.142 Such updating is particularly important as
we move slowly toward “a post-copy world, one where digital works
exist as data flows and rarely reside in a material object for more
than a transitory period of time, where copies blink into and out of
existence on a nearly constant basis.”143
C. Geographical Indications
Its name aside, geographical indication has arguably the
strongest geographical link among all eight forms of intellectual
property rights covered in the TRIPS Agreement.144 The protection
of such indication has also enjoyed growing international support,
including from the nearly thirty signatories to the Lisbon
Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and Their
International Registration.145
141. WILLIAM PATRY, HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT 182 (2011).
142. For this literature, see generally AARON PERZANOWSKI & JASON SCHULTZ,
THE END OF OWNERSHIP: PERSONAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (2016);
Peter K. Yu, The Copy in Copyright, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO
IM/MATERIAL GOODS 65, 79–82 (Jessica C. Lai & Antoinette Maget Dominicé eds.,
2016); Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV.
889 (2011); Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Legislating Digital Exhaustion,
29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1535 (2015) [hereinafter Perzanowski & Schultz,
Legislating Digital Exhaustion].
143. Perzanowski & Schultz, Legislating Digital Exhaustion, supra note 142,
at 1539.
144. These eight forms of rights are copyrights, patents, trademarks,
geographical indications, industrial designs, plant variety protection, layout
designs of integrated circuits, and the protection of undisclosed information. Yu,
supra note 37, at 930–31.
145. See Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and
Their International Registration, Oct. 31, 1958, 923 U.N.T.S. 205 (revised at
Stockholm July 14, 1967); see also WIPO-Administered Treaties Contracting
Parties,
WORLD
INTELL.
PROP.
ORG.,
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Although the United States continues to oppose the expansion
of geographical indications, the protection of these identifiers has
received growing support from select U.S. industries. As Irene
Calboli and I recounted,
Napa Valley Vintners . . . has strongly advocated for such
protection on behalf of its member wineries. In 2007, this trade
group successfully secured protection for “Napa Valley” as a
U.S. geographical indication in the E.U.
A 2013 industry study also provided a long list of potential
U.S. geographical indications. This list included not only
well-known wine-producing regions, but also lesser-known
regions such as Alexandria Lakes in Minnesota, the Bell
Mountain in Texas, the Kanawha River Valley in West Virginia
and the Old Mission Peninsula in Michigan.146

Article 22.1 of the TRIPS Agreement provides, “[g]eographical
indications are . . . indications which identify a good as originating
in the territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory,
where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the
good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin.”147 This
form of protection emphasizes not only the good-identifying
indications and their geographical origins, but also the linkage
between the two.148 A key condition for protecting geographical
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=10
(last
visited Nov. 23, 2017) (listing the members of the Lisbon Agreement) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
146. Peter K. Yu & Irene Calboli, What the US Can Learn from Champagne,
Feta and Gouda, TIME (Sept. 14, 2015), http://time.com/4022907/ttipgeographical-indications/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2017) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review). See generally RICHARD MENDELSON & ZACHARY WOOD,
GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: DEVELOPING A PRELIMINARY
LIST
OF
QUALIFYING
PRODUCT
NAMES
(2013),
http://www.origingi.com/images/stories/PDFs/English/papers/Geographical_Indications_in_the_U
nited_States_-_Supporting_Memo_FINAL_WEB.pdf (providing the 2013 study
prepared by the Organization for an International Geographical Indications
Network); Press Release, Napa Valley Vintners, Napa Valley Receives
Geographic Indication (GI) Status in Europe (May 24, 2007),
https://napavintners.com/press/press_release_detail.asp?ID_News=117
(last
visited Nov. 23, 2017) (announcing that “Napa Valley has been officially
recognized with Geographic Indication . . . Status as a protected name in the
European Union, the first such recognition of an American wine place name”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
147. TRIPS Agreement, art. 22.1.
148. See id. (emphasizing essential attribution).
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indication concerns whether “a given quality, reputation or other
characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its
geographical origin.”149
Notwithstanding the growing protection of geographical
indications through national laws, regional agreements, and
international treaties, a spirited debate has emerged in three
areas. First, developing countries continue to call for an expansion
of the geographical-indication regime beyond the protection of
wines and spirits to cover other products, such as Basmati rice,
Darjeeling tea,150 and products involving traditional knowledge
and traditional cultural expressions.151 They note the vast and
growing benefits of geographical indications to developing
countries.152 By contrast, their opponents lament the continuing
challenges of determining the appropriate geographical scope of

149.
150.

Id.
See KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 239 (2000) (“[T]he evolving language in TRIPs on geographical
indications remains largely . . . confined to wines and spirits, while many
developing countries point to food products that could be protected to their
advantage, such as Basmati rice and Darjeeling tea.”).
151. See GANGJEE, supra note 84, at 266–88 (exploring the use of geographical
indications to protect traditional knowledge).
152. See, e.g., PHILIPPE CULLET, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 333–37 (2005) (discussing how geographical
indications can serve as a tool for protecting traditional knowledge);
GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 84, at 259–435
(collecting articles discussing the promise and problems of using geographical
indications to promote local and rural development); Dwijen Rangnekar,
Indications of Geographical Origin in Asia: Legal and Policy Issues to Resolve, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: DEVELOPMENT
AGENDAS IN A CHANGING WORLD 273, 273 (Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz & Pedro Roffe
eds., 2009) (noting that geographical indications “are increasingly being seen as
useful intellectual property rights for developing countries”); IMPORTANCE OF
PLACE, supra note 84, at 111–287 (collecting articles exploring how geographical
indications can serve as tools for local and regional development); Madhavi
Sunder, The Invention of Traditional Knowledge, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97,
110 (2007) (“Mysore silk sarees . . . have had a makeover since obtaining a
geographical indication, updating [their] look with trendy new (but interestingly,
natural) colors . . . and ‘contemporary’ designs inspired by temple architecture
and tribal jewelry.”).
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new protections.153 Basmati rice, for example, can be found in both
India and Pakistan.154
In addition, some commentators have noted the limited
benefits of expanded protection. Instead, they suggest the use of
certification and collective marks as substitutes.155 Commentators,
including both supporters and critics of geographical indications,
have also cautioned that the holders of these newly expanded
geographical indications will have to conduct “advertising
activities to promote the favourable features of GIs products . . . to
improve their market share and profitability.”156
Second, commentators, especially those from the “New World”
agriculture-producing countries,157 continue to question the
concept of terroir, which has been used to explain the appeal of the
protected good and its linkage to the good’s geographical origin.158
153. See GANGJEE, supra note 84, at 220 (“Having considered the size or scale
of the region of origin, the other controversial issue concerns the basis for
delimitation, which TRIPS leaves to national legislation to resolve. This is
particularly problematic where the region in question straddles two countries.”).
154. See Shubha Ghosh, Globalization, Patents, and Traditional Knowledge,
17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 73, 98 (2003) (“Basmati refers to a particular class of rice,
of which there are at least 400 varieties in India and Pakistan.”).
155. See Justin Hughes, Champagne, Feta, and Bourbon: The Spirited Debate
About Geographical Indications, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 299, 305–11 (2006) (discussing
the different approaches the European Union and the United States have taken
to protect geographical indications and the U.S. position that the use of
certification and collective marks can provide adequate protection to rights
holders). For discussions of certification marks, see generally Margaret Chon,
Marks of Rectitude, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2311 (2009); Jeanne C. Fromer, The
Unregulated Certification Mark(et), 69 STAN. L. REV. 121 (2017).
156. DAGNE, supra note 84, at 144; see also Dev S. Gangjee, From Geography
to History: Geographical Indications and the Reputational Link, in GEOGRAPHICAL
INDICATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 84, at 36 (noting the overlooked
importance of reputation as a linkage between product and place); Doris Estelle
Long, Branding the Land: Creating Global Meanings for Local Characteristics, in
TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND TERRITORIALITY CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY
100, 123 (Irene Calboli & Edward Lee eds., 2014) (“[W]here adequate advertising
and other informational activities are used to promote clear consumer meanings,
geographic designators can serve as powerful ‘brands’ in the ‘long tail’ economy of
the twenty-first century.”).
157. “The New World producers are largely an informal group of
industrialized nations that typically include Japan, the U.S., Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand . . . with a few wine producers from the developing world.”
Hughes, supra note 155, at 301 n.10.
158. As James Wilson, a noted geologist trained at my university, described,
Terroir has become a buzz word in English language wine literature.
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Terroir, which was “originally associated with viticulture and
periodically reinvented not only in France but subsequently across
the [European Union],”159 is one of those French words that cannot
be easily translated in a foreign language.160
Notwithstanding the continued emphasis on terroir, especially
among Western European policymakers and academic experts,
commentators have questioned the validity of the concept.161
Commentators have also noted the concept’s more recent origin
despite its focus on protecting longstanding historical traditions.
According to Laurence Bérard, “[t]he role of terroir in France is
closely linked to the French nation-building project. The concept
itself emerged largely as a result of human geography influences
and its precise definition remains debatable.”162 In view of such a
heavy influence from viticulture, Dev Gangjee understandably
questioned “whether a story of wine should become a story for all
[geographical indications].”163
Finally, geographically based protection can create perverse
incentives for outsiders to drive out those who currently reside in
This lighthearted use disregards reverence for the land which is a
crucial, invisible element of the term. The true concept is not easily
grasped but includes physical elements of the vineyard habitat—the
vine, subsoil, siting, drainage, and microclimate. Beyond the
measurable ecosystem, there is an additional dimension—the spiritual
aspect that recognizes the joys, the heartbreaks, the pride, the sweat,
and the frustrations of its history.
JAMES E. WILSON, TERROIR: THE ROLE OF GEOLOGY, CLIMATE AND CULTURE IN THE
MAKING OF FRENCH WINES 55 (1998).
159. Dev. S. Gangjee, Introduction: Timeless Signs or Signs of the Times?, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS, supra note 84, at 1.
160. See Elizabeth Barham, “Translating Terroir” Revisited: The Global
Challenge of French AOC Labeling, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON GEOGRAPHICAL
INDICATIONS, supra note 84, at 46, 50 (noting that terroir is “a French word
without a suitable English translation”); Laurence Bérard, Terroir and the Sense
of Place, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS, supra note 84,
at 72, 84–86 (discussing whether the term is untranslatable); Hughes, supra note
155, at 301 (noting that “[t]here is no direct English translation of ‘terroir’”).
161. See Barham, supra note 160, at 69 (“There are a number of research
teams in Europe investigating how a terroir marks the taste of its products in
terms of chemical composition and other factors. However, for many products,
this determination is made on the basis of tasting panels.”).
162. Bérard, supra note 160, at 73; see also GANGJEE, supra note 84, at 69
(noting that the concept of terroir did not make its appearance in multilateral
negotiations until April 1890).
163. GANGJEE, supra note 84, at 17.
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the protected territory. For instance, if geographical indications
were narrowly defined based on natural geography to the extent
that they ignore relevant human factors,164 such a narrow
definition could lead the powerful to drive out the weak, regardless
of whether the latter have resided on the land or acted as stewards
for a sustained period of time. To take advantage of geographically
based protection, some commercial productions, for example, may
move into a territory at the expense of those indigenous stewards
who have been cultivating the local products in the first place.165
Indeed, the more protection one could secure through the
ownership of immobile lands, the greater incentive and motivation
one would have to fight for the control of those lands. The problem
identified here is what Doris Long referred to as “the tyranny of
land and culture.”166 As she cautioned, “[w]hile territorial
homelands often play a critical role in the development of
indigenous culture and identity . . . reliance on territorial
boundaries for protection for traditional knowledge may cause
164. See id. at 16 (asking to what extent the “notion of a link between product
and place . . . recognize[s] people”); see also id. at 70 (“Wine itself was not an
unmediated agricultural product and required an additional transformative
human intervention.”); Delphine Marie-Vivien, A Comparative Analysis of GIs for
Handicrafts: The Link to Origin in Culture as Well as Nature?, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS, supra note 84, at 292, 311 (“Most
agricultural and foodstuff products are linked to their origin through both natural
and human factors.”).
165. Such exploitation easily reminds us of the depressing dynamics brought
about by biopiracy, which occurs when commercial productions move into bio-rich
territories at the expense of developing countries, indigenous communities, and
other local populations. For discussions of biopiracy, see generally MGBEOJI, supra
note 84; VANDANA SHIVA, BIOPIRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE
(1997); Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy in the
(Not-So-Brave) New World Order of International Intellectual Property Protection,
6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11 (1998); Peter Drahos, Indigenous Knowledge,
Intellectual Property and Biopiracy: Is a Global Bio-Collecting Society the
Answer?, 2000 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 245 (2000); Paul J. Heald, The Rhetoric of
Biopiracy, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 519 (2003); Ikechi Mgbeoji, Patents and
Traditional Knowledge of the Uses of Plants: Is a Communal Patent Regime Part
of the Solution to the Scourge of Bio Piracy?, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 163
(2001); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Of Seeds and Shamans: The Appropriation of the
Scientific and Technical Knowledge of Indigenous and Local Communities, 17
MICH. J. INT’L L. 919 (1996).
166. Doris Estelle Long, Trade Secrets and Traditional Knowledge:
Strengthening International Protection of Indigenous Innovation, in THE LAW AND
THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 495, 509
n.32 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011).
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unintended, and undesirable, limits on the ability to protect fully
indigenous innovation.”167 Likewise, Madhavi Sunder offered
several justifications for allowing traditional Indian weavers in
Mysore to use the same geographical indication after they move to
North India or the United Kingdom:
[T]here are good reasons to prevent the alienation of the
[geographical indication] from the particular geographical
community. It prevents the scenario in which a large foreign
corporation hires a member of that community away and then
begins to produce “authentic” work elsewhere, using that
[geographical indication]—and decimating the livelihoods of the
traditional community left behind. At the same time, such a
restriction could stifle opportunities for some individuals, as
they remain within a traditional community by economic
necessity, not choice. People move, intermarry, and change jobs.
Culture flows with them.168

D. Regional Intellectual Property Norms
The final illustration that shows the close link between
intellectual property and geography concerns the ongoing
development of regional intellectual property norms, usually
through trade and investment agreements. Although regional
approaches have been used by developed and developing countries

167.
168.

Id.
Sunder, supra note 152, at 115.
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alike169—often to varying degrees of success170—the recent focus on
the development of regional trade agreements has enabled
developed countries to push onto foreign soils the high standards
of intellectual property protection and enforcement.171
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement is one such
regionally based plurilateral agreement that has recently garnered
considerable policy, scholarly, and media attention.172 Described as
169. The following are examples of groups formed using these approaches:
African Group, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations),
APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum), the Andean
Community, CARICOM (Caribbean Community), CARIFORUM
(Caribbean Forum of African, Caribbean and Pacific States), COMESA
(Common Market for East and Southern Africa), ECOWAS (Economic
Community of West African States), the European Union, GRULAC
(Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries), the Gulf
Cooperation Council, . . . MERCOSUR or MERCOSUL (Southern Cone
Common Market)[,] . . . the Group of N (G8, G9, G10, G20, G24, G48,
and G77), the Friends of X (Friends of Development, Friends of Fish,
Friends of Geographical Indications, and Friends of Services), the Cafe
au Lait Group, the CAIRNS Group, the Like-Minded Group, the Group
of Small and Vulnerable Economies, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty
Organization), and OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries).
Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 975, 1081
(2011).
170. See AMRITA NARLIKAR, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: BARGAINING COALITIONS IN THE GATT AND WTO 176 (2003) (noting
that issue-based coalitions work best for small and very specialized economies
with common profiles and interests, but not as well for larger, more diverse, and
often internally conflicting economies); Sonia E. Rolland, Developing Country
Coalitions at the WTO: In Search of Legal Support, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 483, 510
(2007) (noting that “groups of members sharing common profiles and common
interests . . . are better candidates for institutional and legal support than ad hoc
issue-based coalitions”); see also Frederick Abbott, The Future of IPRs in the
Multilateral Trading System, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT
PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY 36, 42 (Christophe Bellmann
et al. eds., 2003) (discussing the developing countries’ limited success in using
coalition-building efforts to increase their bargaining leverage); Peter K. Yu,
Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, and Collective Action, 34 AM. J.L. & MED.
345, 362–65 (2008) (noting the challenge of building a sustained coalition among
the BRICS countries—namely, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa).
171. See supra note 135 (collecting sources discussing the developed countries’
active deployment of regional trade agreements to push for high intellectual
property standards).
172. See TTP Final Table of Contents, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacificpartnership/tpp-full-text (last visited Nov. 23, 2017) [hereinafter TPP Agreement]
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“a cardinal priority and a cornerstone of the Pivot to Asia” under
the Obama Administration,173 this agreement sought to cover “40%
of global GDP [gross domestic product] and some 30% of worldwide
trade in both goods and services.”174 After nearly six years of
negotiations between Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada,
Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore,
the United States, and Vietnam, the TPP Agreement was finally
signed in Auckland, New Zealand on February 4, 2016.175
Despite Japan’s and New Zealand’s ratification of the
agreement,176 President Trump signed a presidential
memorandum on the first day of his first full week in office
directing the United States Trade Representative to withdraw the
United States “as a signatory of the TPP and . . . from the TPP
negotiating process.”177 Other countries such as Vietnam have also
suspended its ratification process.178 While the TPP is now
(showing the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, February 4, 2016) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
173. KURT M. CAMPBELL, THE PIVOT: THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN STATECRAFT IN
ASIA 268 (2016).
174. David A. Gantz, The TPP and RCEP: Mega-Trade Agreements for the
Pacific Rim, 33 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 57, 59 (2016).
175. See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Trans-Pacific
Partnership Ministers’ Statement (Feb. 4, 2016), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policyoffices/press-office/press-releases/2016/February/TPP-Ministers-Statement (last
visited Nov. 23, 2017) (announcing the signing of the agreement) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
176. See Kaori Kaneko & Yoshifumi Takemoto, Japan Ratifies TPP Trade
Pact to Fly the Flag for Free Trade, REUTERS (Dec 9, 2016, 12:55 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-tpp-idUSKBN13Y0CU (last visited Nov.
23, 2017) (reporting Japan’s ratification) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); NZ Govt Ratifies TPP Despite US Rejection, RADIO N.Z. (May 11,
2017, 2:59 PM), http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/political/330574/nz-govt-ratifiestpp-despite-us-rejection (last visited Nov. 23, 2017) (reporting New Zealand’s
ratification) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
177. Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal of the United States
from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement, WHITE HOUSE
(Jan.
23,
2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2017/01/23/presidential-memorandum-regarding-withdrawal-unitedstates-trans-pacific (last visited Dec. 6, 2017) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
178. See Ho Binh Minh, Vietnam PM Backs Off from U.S.-Led TPP,
Emphasizes Independent Foreign Policy, REUTERS (Nov. 16, 2016, 9:32 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-economy-tpp-idUSKBN13C06V (last
visited Nov. 23, 2017) (reporting that “Vietnam will shelve ratification of a
U.S.-led Pacific trade accord due to political changes ahead in the United States”)
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arguably “on life support” and its future remains highly
uncertain,179 important insights can be gleaned by comparing this
partnership with another similar regional pact, the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).180
Like the TPP, the RCEP is a regional initiative in the
Asia-Pacific region.181 Unlike the TPP, however, the parties
negotiating the RCEP make more geographical sense. The latter
negotiations currently include Australia, China, India, Japan,
New Zealand, South Korea, and the ten members of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which negotiate
as a bloc.182 Launched in November 2012 under the ASEAN+6
framework, the RCEP negotiations built on past trade and nontrade discussions between ASEAN and its six major Asia-Pacific
neighbors.183 Although ASEAN includes both developed and
developing countries, all ten ASEAN members are included in the
RCEP negotiations.184
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
179. See Yu, Thinking About TPP, supra note 88 (manuscript at 2) (discussing
the United States’ withdrawal from the TPP). Since the United States’
withdrawal, efforts have been made to resuscitate the agreement. These efforts,
however, have not borne fruit. At the time of writing, no country is actively
pursuing the agreement’s ratification. Nevertheless, at a May 2017 APEC
meeting in Hanoi, Vietnam, these countries, along with the remaining TPP
partners, reaffirmed their commitment and agreed to explore the development of
a process to move the agreement forward even without the United States’
participation. Associated Press, Pacific Ministers Commit to Move Ahead with
Pact Without US, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 21, 2017, 6:11 AM),
https://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2017-05-21/pacific-ministerscommit-to-move-ahead-with-pact-without-us (last visited Nov. 23, 2017) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
180. For discussions of the RCEP, see generally Peter K. Yu, The RCEP and
Trans-Pacific Intellectual Property Norms, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 673 (2017)
(discussing the RCEP); Yu, TPP, RCEP and Copyright Normsetting, supra note
88; Yu, TPP, RCEP and Crossvergence, supra note 88.
181. See Yu, supra note 180, at 675 (discussing both the TPP and the RCEP
as “important regional pact[s]”).
182. See JOINT DECLARATION ON THE LAUNCH OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE
REGIONAL
COMPREHENSIVE
ECONOMIC
PARTNERSHIP,
http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/rcep/news/Documents/joint-declaration-onthe-launch-of-negotiations-for-the-regional-comprehensive-economicpartnership.pdf (declaring the formal launch of the RCEP negotiations).
183. See generally Yu, supra note 180, at 678–85 (discussing the historical
origin of the RCEP negotiations).
184. The ten current ASEAN members are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia,
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and
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The inclusiveness of the RCEP negotiations stands in sharp
contrast to the arbitrary selections made during the TPP
negotiations.185 Indeed, the invitations to the latter negotiations
did not make much sense in terms of either political or economic
geography.186 In terms of the former, the TPP negotiations
included select countries from the Asia-Pacific region.187 Yet, they
did not include China, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, South
Korea, and Thailand—all crucial members of the Asian
economy.188 The twelve-member (and now eleven-member) TPP
also differs significantly from its predecessor, the Trans-Pacific
Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement,189 which was
commonly referred to as “P4” or the “Pacific Four.”190 P4 began as
a negotiation among three small economies with highly liberalized
trade sectors—namely, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore.191
Geographically, these countries were well-positioned to enable the
Vietnam. ASEAN Member Countries, ASS’N SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS,
http://asean.org/asean/asean-member-states/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2017) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
185. See Yu, TPP and Trans-Pacific Perplexities, supra note 88, at 1157
(“From the current list of twelve countries, it is indeed hard to divine the logic
behind the countries chosen to negotiate the TPP, other than historical legacy and
the self-interested preferences of the more powerful negotiating parties.”).
186. The RCEP negotiations will make better sense in terms of political
geography, due to their inclusiveness. They will, however, remain problematic in
terms of economic geography, due to the highly uneven economic developments in
the Asia-Pacific region.
187. See supra note 175 and accompanying text (listing the twelve
Asia-Pacific countries involved in the TPP negotiations).
188. See Yu, TPP and Trans-Pacific Perplexities, supra note 88, at 1132–63
(discussing the exclusion of China and India from the TPP negotiations); id. at
1156 (noting that the TPP negotiations have excluded “other large developing
countries in [Asia], such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and South
Korea”).
189. Trans-Pacific
Strategic
Economic
Partnership
Agreement,
Brunei-Chile-N.Z.-Sing., July 18, 2005, 2592 U.N.T.S. 225.
190. See Meredith Kolsky Lewis, Expanding the P-4 Trade Agreement into a
Broader Trans-Pacific Partnership: Implications, Risks and Opportunities, 4
ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 401, 403 (2009) (referring to the
agreement as the “P-4 Agreement”).
191. See id. at 403 (“[The TPP negotiations were initially] launched by Chile,
New Zealand and Singapore at the APEC leaders’ summit in 2002. These original
negotiations contemplated an agreement amongst the three participating
countries, to be known as the Pacific Three Closer Economic Partnership (P3
CEP).”).
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resulting partnership to provide entry points into three regional
trading networks.192
In terms of economic geography, the composition of the TPP
membership is even more perplexing. While P4 focused on initially
three, and later four, small economies—with Brunei Darussalam
joining Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore193—the TPP does not
follow similar logic. When the P4 negotiations were launched in
2002, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore had a GDP of 70, 67, and
92 billion, respectively.194 By contrast, when the TPP negotiations
were concluded in 2015, Japan and the United States enjoyed a
GDP of 4.38 and 18.04 trillion, respectively (see Table 1).
Meanwhile, the equivalent figures for Brunei Darussalam, Peru,
and Vietnam were only 13, 189, and 193 billion, respectively.

192. As I explained in an earlier article,
Strategically, FTAs and [economic partnership agreements] provide
important entry points into other regional or plurilateral networks. In
doing so, they allow developed countries to explore interstate
relationships with a smaller number of countries. Such an
arrangement helps reduce the complexity and high costs of negotiation
with a large number of parties or a complex regional body. The
negotiation of the agreements also helps countries test the feasibility
of applying specific models to a particular region. In fact, because the
agreements involve self-selected parties, they allow parties to avoid
negotiation of issues that would require them to make concessions that
are important to their domestic constituencies. The exclusion of issues
will also quicken the negotiation process, as those issues tend to slow
down, if not derail, the negotiations.
Peter K. Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 953, 970–71 (2011);
see also Sidney Weintraub, Lessons from the Chile and Singapore Free Trade
Agreements, in FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: US STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES 79, 79
(Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2004) (noting that the U.S. FTAs with Chile and Singapore
were “intended to be bellwethers for future FTAs in both regions, some bilateral
and others plurilateral, as well as to set the substantive parameters for the
hemispherewide Free Trade Area of the Americas”).
193. See Lewis, supra note 190, at 403–04 (“Brunei attended a number of
rounds as an observer, and ultimately joined the Agreement as a ‘founding
member’. The Agreement was signed by New Zealand, Chile and Singapore on
July 18, 2005 and by Brunei on August 2, 2005, following the conclusion of
negotiations in June 2005.”).
194. Data:
GDP
(Current
US$),
WORLD
BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2002 (last visited
Nov. 23, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Table 1. GDP and GDP per Capita of the
TPP Negotiating Parties in 2015
Negotiating
Party
Australia
Brunei Darussalam
Canada
Chile
Japan
Malaysia
Mexico
New Zealand
Peru
Singapore
United States
Vietnam

GDP (US$M)195
1,345,383.14
12,930.39
1,552,807.65
242,517.91
4,383,076.30
296,283.19
1,151,037.12
175,564.43
189,212.10
296,840.70
18,036,648.00
193,241.11

GDP per capita
(US$)196
56,554.0
30,967.9
43,315.7
13,653.2
34,474.1
9,643.6
9,143.1
38,201.9
6,030.3
53,629.7
56,207.0
2,107.0

To be certain, one could argue that the TPP partners have
been carefully selected to ensure that the participating countries
can meet strong “twenty-first-century” trade and investment
standards.197 The RCEP, by contrast, had to include special and
195. Id.
196. Data:
GDP
per
Capita
(Current
US$),
WORLD
BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?end=2015 (last visited
Nov. 23, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
197. See USTR Begins TPP Talks in Australia,
OFF. U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE (Mar. 15, 2010), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/pressoffice/press-releases/2010/march/ustr-begins-tpp-talks-australia (last visited
Nov. 23, 2017) (“Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations offer a unique
opportunity
to
shape
a
high-standard,
broad-based
regional
pact . . . . Our . . . negotiators will be working to set a new standard for 21st
century trade pacts.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). As Lim
Chin Leng, Deborah Elms, and Patrick Low observed,
One of the unusual elements of the TPP is the fact that members of the
TPP represent a range of economic development, from the world’s
largest economy to a lower middle income economy. While members
have been clear that the TPP will not have any sort of “two speed” or
explicit special and differential . . . treatment for developing country
members, it is true that the final Agreement will need to have some
provisions to account for the developmental aspects of some members.
C.L. Lim et al., What Is “High-Quality, Twenty-First Century” Anyway?, in THE
TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: A QUEST FOR A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY TRADE
AGREEMENT 3, 12 (C.L. Lim et al. eds., 2012); see also Shujiro Urata, A Stages
Approach to Regional Economic Integration in Asia Pacific: The RCEP, TPP, and
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differential treatment to accommodate the needs, interests,
conditions, and priorities of the least developed ASEAN
members—namely,
Cambodia,
Laos,
and
Myanmar.198
Nevertheless, the TPP partners’ reluctance to provide special and
differential treatment to their poorer neighbors does not explain
the exclusion of some major Asian economies, such as China, India,
Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. Instead,
such exclusion seems to be best attributed to geopolitics. As
Shintaro Hamanaka noted,
[T]he formation of regional integration and cooperation
frameworks can be best understood as a dominant state’s
attempt to create its own regional framework where it can
exercise some exclusive influence. . . . For an economy that
wants to increase its influence [such as the United States],
establishing a regional group where it can be the most powerful
state—dominating other members in terms of material
capacity—is convenient. The most powerful state is likely to be
influential in the group because it can easily assume so-called
“structural leadership,” which is based on material
resources . . . . By assuming leadership, an economy can set a
favorable agenda and establish convenient rules. In addition,
the most powerful state can increase influence through prestige
and asymmetric economic interdependence with others.199

One could further defend the TPP by observing that the pact
will eventually be opened up to all members of the Asia-Pacific
region.200 In the view of these defenders, when the TPP partners
FTAAP, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 119, 127
(Tang Guoqiang & Peter A. Petri eds., 2014) (“One of the main differences
between the TPP and the RCEP is the treatment of least-developed economies.”).
198. See Urata, supra note 197, at 127 (discussing the RCEP negotiating
parties’ willingness to provide special and differential treatment to least
developed countries); see also Barry Desker, ASEAN Integration Remains an
Illusion, E. ASIA F. (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/04/02/
asean-integration-remains-an-illusion/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2017) (“There is a
real worry that a ‘two-stage’ ASEAN is emerging. The six earlier members plus
Vietnam are leading the way while Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos remain mired
in their least-developed country status.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
199. SHINTARO HAMANAKA, TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP VERSUS REGIONAL
COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP: CONTROL OF MEMBERSHIP AND AGENDA
SETTING 1–2 (Asian Dev. Bank, Working Paper Series on Reg’l Econ. Integration
No. 146, 2014), https://aric.adb.org/pdf/workingpaper/WP146_Hamanaka_TransPacific_Partnership.pdf (footnote and citations omitted).
200. Article 30.4.1 of the TPP Agreement specifically states that the
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selected negotiating partners, they merely embraced a
building-block approach, focusing on gateway markets in select
regions.201 The United States used that approach to develop free
trade agreements with Australia, Singapore, and Morocco.202
Agreement
is open to accession by:
(a) any State or separate customs territory that is a member of APEC;
and
(b) any other State or separate customs territory as the Parties may
agree,
that is prepared to comply with the obligations in this Agreement . . . .
TPP Agreement, supra note 172, art. 30.4.1; see also CAMPBELL, supra note 173,
at 269:
[I]f and when the TPP is passed, the United States should work to
encourage and assist in China’s movement toward the realization of
the TPP’s lofty entry requirements, with an aim of ultimately
welcoming China into the agreement. Because the TPP is aspirational
rather than invitational, the United States should make it clear that
China’s entry will be welcomed as long as it can meet the agreement’s
standards.
Ann Capling & John Ravenhill, The TPP: Multilateralizing Regionalism or the
Securitization of Trade Policy?, in THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: A QUEST FOR
A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY TRADE AGREEMENT, supra note 197, at 279, 292
(“Obama identified the TPP as a ‘potential model’ for the entire region, thus
melding together US business interests and foreign policy interests to put
pressure on China and others.”); JEFFREY J. SCHOTT ET AL., UNDERSTANDING THE
TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 58 (2012) (“We see little evidence to support the
notion that China is being excluded as part of a broader containment strategy.”).
201. As I explained in an earlier article,
Strategically, FTAs and [economic partnership agreements] provide
important entry points into other regional or plurilateral networks. In
doing so, they allow developed countries to explore interstate
relationships with a smaller number of countries. Such an
arrangement helps reduce the complexity and high costs of negotiation
with a large number of parties or a complex regional body. The
negotiation of the agreements also helps countries test the feasibility
of applying specific models to a particular region. In fact, because the
agreements involve self-selected parties, they allow parties to avoid
negotiation of issues that would require them to make concessions that
are important to their domestic constituencies. The exclusion of issues
will also quicken the negotiation process, as those issues tend to slow
down, if not derail, the negotiations.
Yu, supra note 192, at 970–71.
202. See Jason Kearns, United States–Morocco Free Trade Agreement, in
BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: CASE STUDIES 144, 146 (Simon
Lester & Bryan Mercurio eds., 2009) (noting that the United States–Morocco Free
Trade Agreement reflected “a ‘building block’ approach: first ensuring that
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China, a TPP outsider, also used that approach to develop free
trade agreements with Chile, Iceland, and New Zealand.203
Nevertheless, if the building-block approach was the one
chosen to set new international norms for trade, intellectual
property, and investment, those analyses that treat the TPP as a
plurilateral partnership,204 as opposed to a regional pact, will be
more insightful. After all, with the involvement of developed
countries and their likeminded partners, commentators have
already widely discussed the TPP as a “country club.”205 While
club-based agreements may have a regional focus, they do not
always behave like traditional regional trade agreements.
By ignoring a large number of Asian countries—both
significant and relatively insignificant—the TPP Agreement also
fails to tackle a key challenge to improving intellectual property
protection and enforcement in Asia. Because the levels of
protection and enforcement in Asia continue to vary from country
to country,206 pirated and counterfeit goods will continue to flow
countries accede to the WTO, then negotiating trade and investment agreements
with individual countries in the region . . . and finally reaching a comprehensive
United States–Middle East Free Trade Area”); Weintraub, supra note 192, at 79
(noting that the U.S. FTAs with Chile and Singapore were “intended to be
bellwethers for future FTAs in both regions, some bilateral and others
plurilateral, as well as to set the substantive parameters for the hemispherewide
Free Trade Area of the Americas”).
203. See Henry Gao, The RTA Strategy of China: A Critical Visit, in
CHALLENGES TO MULTILATERAL TRADE: THE IMPACT OF BILATERAL, PREFERENTIAL
AND REGIONAL AGREEMENTS 53, 60 (Ross Buckley et al. eds., 2008) (discussing
China’s focus on negotiations with those who are already members of other
regional trade agreements); Yu, supra note 192, at 1001 (noting that Chile, New
Zealand, and Iceland were the first in their respective region to sign a free trade
agreement with China).
204. See Simon Lester & Bryan Mercurio, Introduction to BILATERAL AND
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: CASE STUDIES, supra note 202, at 1, 2 (defining
“‘loose’ regional trade agreements” as “plurilateral agreements among countries
which may or may not be in somewhat close proximity to each other, but do not
necessarily include all countries from that area”).
205. For discussions of this approach, see generally Daniel Gervais, Country
Clubs, Empiricism, Blogs and Innovation: The Future of International Intellectual
Property Norm Making in the Wake of ACTA, in TRADE GOVERNANCE IN THE
DIGITAL AGE: WORLD TRADE FORUM 323 (Mira Burri & Thomas Cottier eds., 2012);
Peter K. Yu, The ACTA/TPP Country Clubs, in ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND
KNOWLEDGE: 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
KNOWLEDGE GOVERNANCE 258 (Dana Beldiman ed., 2014).
206. See MARK BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC: ASEAN, APEC AND
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from high-protectionist jurisdictions to their low-protectionist
counterparts. That many low-protectionist countries enjoy
geographical proximity to TPP partners has made the spillover
problem especially difficult to address. One therefore cannot help
but wonder the TPP Agreement’s effectiveness in providing a
regional solution to the thorny piracy and counterfeiting problems
in Asia.
IV. Geographical Complexities207
The previous Part has underscored the close link between
intellectual property and geography. This link is longstanding and
can be traced back to the origin of federal intellectual property
protection in the United States and the development of the
international intellectual property regime, among others. Part III
has also noted some of the challenging intellectual property issues
that can benefit from greater geographical insights and spatial
analysis.
While it is lamentable that geographical methodologies are not
used more widely in an area that continues to be heavily influenced
by distance and borders, this Part highlights a key challenge in the
intellectual property field: even if policymakers, judges, and
commentators are willing to consider geographical factors, they
subscribe to a rather narrow view of geography. As a result, their
overly simplistic spatial analysis often privileges political
BEYOND 17–55, 74–101 (2009)
In the Asia-Pacific, . . . there is a far greater range of potential
members in terms of their respective levels of economic development
and organization, political practices and structures of government, and
even in their respective cultural traditions and backgrounds,
something that reduces the ability to act in concert as a consequence.
Peter K. Yu, Clusters and Links in Asian Intellectual Property Law and Policy, in
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ASIAN LAW 147, 148 (Christoph Antons ed., 2017) (“The
intellectual property developments in Asia are dynamic, distinct and diverse.
These developments have also been highly uneven, not to mention changing
rapidly. What we see today consists of largely works in progress.”).
207. Drawing on three sets of examples I have explored in some depth in the
past, this Part, along with Part V.B.1, includes materials that have been updated
and expanded from my earlier works. See generally Yu, Seamless Global Digital
Marketplace, supra note 140; Yu, Cultural Relics, supra note 85; Peter K. Yu,
Intellectual Property Geographies, 6 WIPO J. 1 (2014).
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geography208—geography of those in power209—over other equally
important forms of geography, such as social, economic, and
cultural geography.210
Overlooking these different geographical sub-fields not only
weakens spatial analysis but also takes away a valuable
opportunity to improve the development of intellectual property
law and policy. To highlight the need for a more geographically
informed approach to law- and policy-making, this Part identifies
the geographical complexities in three sets of issues: those
occurring (1) inside the border (national);211 (2) across the border
(international);212 and (3) beyond the border (global).213

208. See PARAG KHANNA, CONNECTOGRAPHY: MAPPING THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL
CIVILIZATION 14 (2016) (“We should never confuse geography, which is
paramount, with political geography, which is transient. Unfortunately, maps
today present natural or political geography—or both—as permanent
constraints.”); see also Chon, supra note 65, at 17 (“A map is at best a model of a
moment in time rather than a rigid constraint on future possibilities.”).
209. See Michel Foucault, The Eye of Power, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED
INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS, 1972–1977, at 146, 149 (Colin Gordon ed., 1980)
(“A whole history remains to be written of spaces—which would at the same time
be the history of powers . . . .”). But cf. KHANNA, supra note 208, at 45 (“The biggest
mistake our traditional maps make is to portray countries as unified wholes,
equating political geography with sovereign authority—as if having a country
means you actually control it. Instead of mapping de jure sovereignty, we should
be mapping de facto authority.”).
210. See DE BLIJ, supra note 22, at 8 (“Geography is a discipline of diversity,
under whose ‘spatial’ umbrella we study and analyze processes, systems,
behaviors, and countless other phenomena that have spatial expression.”); Holder
& Harrison, supra note 57, at 5 (“Geography embraces physical, social, economic,
and cultural geography and a host of sub-categories in between, and studies are
conducted on a range of spatial scales.”). For collections of articles on economic
geography, see generally THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY, supra
note 6, at 49; The SAGE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY (Andrew Leyshon
& Roger Lee eds., 2011). For collections of articles on social, cultural, or human
geography, see generally HANDBOOK OF CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY (Kay Anderson &
Mona Domosh eds., 2002); THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY (Roger
Lee & Noel Castree eds., 2d ed. 2014); THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
GEOGRAPHIES (Susan J. Smith & Rachel Pain eds., 2009).
211. Infra Part III.A.
212. Infra Part III.B.
213. Infra Part III.C.
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A. Inside the Border
The first set of issues occurs inside the border. Because
sovereign states remain the predominant source of law and
policy,214 intellectual property law and policy tends to be developed
at the national level before adjustments trickle down to the lower
levels.215 In the United States, for instance, federal protection
exists for copyright, patent, and trademark laws.216 Such
protection preempts state laws in the event of a conflict between
the two sets of laws.217 Although preemption works well for the
214. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1)–(2)
(1987):
[A] state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to (1) (a) conduct
that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory; (b)
the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its
territory; . . . (2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its
nationals . . . within its territory . . . .
See also Aoki, supra note 65, at 1318 (“[T]he sovereign nation-state was seen as
having jurisdiction backed up by force over clearly delimited and generally
continuous spatial areas as against other nation-states, as well as autonomy with
regard to the citizens within its boundaries.”); David Delaney, Introduction:
Globalization and Law, in LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER, supra note 54, at 252
(“According to a conventional, and still prominent, interpretation of the spatiality
of law, the space of law is the space of the nation-state, and the boundaries of the
territorially defined state provide the boundaries to law.”).
215. See National IP Strategies, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/ipstrategies/en/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2017) (outlining the
development of national intellectual property strategies in different parts of the
world) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
216. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2012) (providing
federal copyright protection); Lanham Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n
(2012) (providing federal trademark protection); Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 35 U.S.C.) (providing federal patent protection).
217. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (providing federal copyright preemption of state
rights); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151
(1989) (“To a limited extent, the federal patent laws must determine not only what
is protected, but also what is free for all to use.”); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470, 491–92 (1974) (“[S]ince there is no real possibility that trade secret
law will conflict with the federal policy favoring disclosure of clearly patentable
inventions partial pre-emption is inappropriate.”); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964) (“[W]hen an article is unprotected by a
patent or a copyright, state law may not forbid others to copy that article. To
forbid copying would interfere with the federal policy . . . of allowing free access
to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public
domain.”); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232–33 (1964) (“[A]
state may not, when the article is unpatented and uncopyrighted, prohibit the
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U.S. intellectual property system, not all countries adopt a
federalist approach.218 Nor do they use similar conflict-resolution
techniques.219
Regardless of how a country resolves conflicts between the
national and the subnational, however, there is an inherent
mismatch between the protection based on territorial borders as
defined by the nation-state concept on the one hand and innovation
and industrial production at the subnational level on the other.
While the former is based on political geography, the latter is based
on economic geography.220
As I noted in recent articles, one of the major challenges
concerning large developing countries is the rapidly expanding
divide between economically and technologically developed regions
and their less-developed counterparts.221 While it is nothing new
for developing countries to have highly uneven development,222
copying of the article itself or award damages for such copying.”); Peter K. Yu,
Note, Fictional Persona Test: Copyright Preemption in Human Audiovisual
Characters, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 355, 367–75 (1998) (discussing federal copyright
preemption of state right of publicity laws).
218. See YASH GHAI, HONG KONG’S NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: THE
RESUMPTION OF CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BASIC LAW 442–49 (1997)
(discussing how other countries resolve the state-federal issues).
219. Cf. Peter K. Yu, The Anatomy of the Human Rights Framework for
Intellectual Property, 69 SMU L. REV. 37, 78–79 (2016) (discussing the different
ways to resolve conflicts between competing rights).
220. As Paul Krugman reminded us,
A nation is not a region or a single location. That is, when we talk about
the external economies that I have argued drive both localization and
the emergence of core-periphery patterns, there is no reason to suppose
that political boundaries define the relevant unit over which those
external economies apply.
KRUGMAN, GEOGRAPHY AND TRADE, supra note 6, at 70.
221. See Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Asian Values, 16 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 329, 395–96 (2012) [hereinafter Yu, Intellectual Property
and Asian Values] (discussing the uneven economic and technological
developments in Asia); Peter K. Yu, The Middle Intellectual Property Powers, in
LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES: AVOIDING THE
MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP 84, 98–99 (Randall Peerenboom & Tom Ginsburg eds.,
2014) (discussing the uneven developments and internal tensions within the
middle intellectual property powers).
222. See Yu, Intellectual Property and Asian Values, supra note 221, at 395–
96 (discussing the uneven intellectual property developments in Asia); see also
infra text accompanying notes 235–236 (discussing the uneven economic
developments in India and Brazil).
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such development could pose a serious challenge to the existing
intellectual property system—both domestic and international
alike.
Since the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement in 1994,
international intellectual property literature has been filled with
critiques of the “one size fits all”—or, more precisely, “supersize
fits all”—approach to intellectual property normsetting.223 Yet
these critiques tend to end at the national border, with the trust
and expectation that a sovereign government will ultimately strike
the appropriate balance for its country. Few, if any, articles or book
chapters have problematized the “one size fits all” approach to
intellectual property normsetting within an individual country.224
When one adjusts the scale of the map to zoom in on the
economic and technological developments in large developing
countries, one cannot help but notice the alarming unevenness of
these developments. Take China for an example. The economic and
technological developments in its major cities and coastal regions
far exceed those in the inner and rural areas.225 Based on the 2016
223. See Shamnad Basheer & Annalisa Primi, The WIPO Development
Agenda: Factoring in the “Technologically Proficient” Developing Countries, in
IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION’S
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 100, 110 (Jeremy de Beer ed., 2009) [hereinafter
IMPLEMENTING WIPO’S DEVELOPMENT AGENDA] (alluding to the “one
‘super-size’-fits-all model”); Jeremy de Beer, Defining WIPO’s Development
Agenda, in IMPLEMENTING WIPO’S DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra, 1, 3 (referring
to “a one-size, especially a supersize, model of global [intellectual property] law”);
James Boyle, A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual Property, 2004
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. No. 9, at 4 (“One size fits all. And it is ‘extra large.’”); Peter
K. Yu, The Global Intellectual Property Order and Its Undetermined Future, 1
WIPO J. 1, 9 (2009) (noting the problems with a “super-size-fits-all model”).
224. Interestingly, Keith Aoki discussed the issue in the opposite direction:
If . . . globalization is heterogeneous, lumpy, incomplete, and uneven,
and bypasses large regions of the world, then a “one-size-fits-all”
approach towards international intellectual property protection may
reproduce on a global scale the problematic and sharp inequalities of
access and information that currently characterize development on the
regional or national scales.
Aoki, supra note 65, at 1344. The late Professor Aoki was aware of the problem
at both the national and regional levels, yet his pioneering article focused on the
challenge when the problem was extended to the global level.
225. As I noted in an earlier book chapter,
The goods that are in high demand in the inland and rural areas are
often very different from those in the major cities and the coastal areas.
Because of these differing market conditions, local people in the less
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figures on invention patents provided by the State Intellectual
Property Office of China, Jiangsu, Guangdong, and Anhui
provinces—the provinces with the three largest volumes of
applications—had a total of 184,632, 155,581, and 95,963,
respectively.226 Meanwhile, Yunnan, Jilin, and Gansu provinces
had a total of only 7,907, 7,537, and 6,114, respectively.227 The
latter figures were less than one-tenth of the figures in the more
developed provinces. If one includes provinces and autonomous
regions with fewer than 4,000 patent applications, such as
Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Qinghai, Hainan, and Tibet,
the statistical contrasts between the two groups will become even
starker (see Table 2).

developed parts of China understandably are less aware of the
importance of intellectual property protection. Nor do they have much
need for it. Those places are also likely to present greater structural
problems for intellectual property enforcement, such as inefficient
administration, low penalties, shortage of funds, local protectionism,
and severe conflicts of interests. Meanwhile, the limited economic and
technological developments in these areas have heavily constrained
the local resources devoted to research and development efforts.
Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle,
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173, 203 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 1st
ed. 2007) (footnote omitted).
226. Table 2 Distribution of [Applications for] Inventions Received from Home
2016, ST. INTELL. PROP. OFF. PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Apr. 7, 2017),
http://english.sipo.gov.cn/statistics/2016/12/201704/t20170407_1309326.html
(last visited Nov. 23, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
227. Id.
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Table 2. Volume of Applications and Grants for
Invention Patents in Mainland China in 2016228
Province
Jiangsu
Guangdong
Anhui
Zhejiang
Shandong
Sichuan
Hubei
Guangxi
Henan
Fujian
Liaoning
Hunan
Shaanxi
Hebei
Heilongjiang
Guizhou
Shanxi
Jiangxi
Yunnan
Jilin
Gansu
Xinjiang
Inner Mongolia
Ningxia
Qinghai
Hainan
Tibet

Volume of
Patent
Applications229
184,632
155,581
95,963
93,254
88,359
54,277
43,789
43,078
28,582
27,041
25,561
25,524
22,565
14,141
13,177
10,953
8,208
8,202
7,907
7,537
6,114
3,598
2,878
2,510
1,381
1,278
176

Volume
of Patent
Grants230
40,952
38,626
15,292
26,576
19,404
10,350
8,517
5,159
6,811
7,170
6,731
6,967
7,503
4,247
4,345
2,036
2,411
1,914
2,125
2,428
1,308
910
871
560
271
383
33

Patent
Grant
Rate (%)
22.18
24.83
15.94
28.50
21.96
19.07
19.45
11.98
23.83
26.52
26.33
27.30
33.25
30.03
32.97
18.59
29.37
23.34
26.87
32.21
21.39
25.29
30.26
22.31
19.62
29.97
18.75

228. This table focuses on only mainland China and excludes Hong Kong,
Macau, and Taiwan. It also omits municipalities such as Beijing, Chongqing,
Shanghai, and Tianjin.
229. See id. (listing the yearly total patent applications for 2016).
230. See Table 5 Distribution of Grants for Inventions Received from Home
2016, ST. INTELL. PROP. OFF. PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Apr. 7, 2017),
http://english.sipo.gov.cn/statistics/2016/12/201704/t20170407_1309322.html
(last
visited Nov. 23, 2017) (listing the yearly total patent grants for 2016) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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From the standpoint of intellectual property development,
having highly uneven subnational development could create major
challenges for policymakers, especially in relation to the
establishment of a national intellectual property strategy, such as
the one the State Council of China launched in June 2008.231 If the
relevant government leaders seek to tailor protection to the
divergent economic and technological conditions in different
regions, they likely will have to come up with a “schizophrenic”
nationwide intellectual property policy.232 Under such a policy,
protection will be tighter in fast-growing and technologically
proficient regions but much weaker in their less-developed
counterparts.233
By contrast, if the leaders embrace uniform nationwide
protection and decline to tailor protection to the country’s
divergent conditions, they will have to develop a system that is
either too strong or too weak for some regions. Even worse, they
may end up with a system that is unsuitable for all regions—for
instance, when the system grants compromise-induced mid-level
protection that would be too low for fast-growing regions yet too
high for their less-developed counterparts.
To be certain, the adoption of a national intellectual property
strategy could still generate net economic gains for the whole
country, especially when that strategy is carefully designed and
implemented. Nevertheless, these gains will not be fairly
distributed unless a well-functioning transfer mechanism exists to
allow fast-growing regions to share new benefits with the

231. See Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy, ST. COUNCIL
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (June 5, 2008), http://www.gov.cn/english/200806/21/content_1023471.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2017) (providing an English
translation of the Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Peter K. Yu, The Rise and
Decline of the Intellectual Property Powers, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 525, 530–32
(2012) (discussing the National Intellectual Property Strategy).
232. See Peter K. Yu, International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and
Intellectual Property Schizophrenia, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (explaining
why the intellectual property developments in China should not be analyzed as if
the country were homogeneous).
233. See id. at 25 (“[B]ased on existing developments, China is likely to prefer
stronger protection of intellectual property rights in entertainment, software,
semiconductors, and selected areas of biotechnology to increased protection in
areas concerning pharmaceuticals, chemicals, fertilizers, seeds, and foodstuffs.”).
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less-developed regions.234 Thus, unless the central government is
willing to step in to transfer these benefits, those regions with
unsuitable levels of intellectual property protection are likely to
remain losers in the system. As time goes by, the gap between the
fast-growing and less-developed regions can only expand.
Although my past research focuses primarily on China,
uneven subnational development is not limited to this country.
Instead, such uneven development can be found in many similarly
situated countries. As Fareed Zakaria reminded us, India “might
have several Silicon Valleys, but it also has three Nigerias within
it—that is, more than 300 million people living on less than a
dollar a day.”235 Nobel Laureate Michael Spence also wrote about
the “dual economy” in Brazil, which consists of “a relatively rich
one whose growth is constrained by the normal forces that
constrain the growth of relatively advanced economies, and a poor
one where the early-stage growth dynamics . . . just didn’t start,
owing to its separation from the modern domestic economy and the
global economy.”236
234. As Frederick Abbott reminded us in relation to cross-sectoral bargains
made in bilateral and regional trade agreements,
The problem with . . . using net economic gains or losses as the
developing country benchmark is that gains for a developing country’s
textile or agricultural producers do not directly translate into higher
public or private health expenditures. Salaries for part of the workforce
may increase and government tax revenues may rise, and this may
indirectly help offset pharmaceutical price increases. However, in
order for the health sector not to be adversely affected, there must be
some type of transfer payment, whether in the form of increased public
health expenditures on pharmaceuticals, by providing health
insurance benefits, or other affirmative acts. In a world of economic
scarcity, the prospect that governments will act to offset increases in
medicines prices with increased public health expenditures is
uncertain.
Frederick M. Abbott, The Cycle of Action and Reaction: Developments and Trends
in Intellectual Property and Health, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 27, 33 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006) (citation
omitted).
235. FAREED ZAKARIA, THE POST-AMERICAN WORLD 133 (2008); see also VINAY
RAI & WILLIAM L. SIMON, THINK INDIA: THE RISE OF THE WORLD’S NEXT
SUPERPOWER AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR EVERY AMERICAN 211 (2007) (“One India
wants. The Other India hopes. One India leads. The Other India follows.”
(emphasis omitted)).
236. MICHAEL SPENCE, THE NEXT CONVERGENCE: THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC
GROWTH IN A MULTISPEED WORLD 204 (2011).
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Even in the developed world, uneven economic and
technological developments at the subnational level are quite
common. As Annalisa Primi pointed out in an essay published in
the report on the 2013 Global Innovation Index,
In the USA and in Germany, the top R&D investing regions—
California and Baden-Württemberg—account, respectively, for
21% and 25% of total country investments in R&D. In Finland
and the Republic of Korea, the top regions—Etela-Suomi and
the Korean Capital Region—account for 55% and 63% of total
R&D expenditures.237

At the global level, “[t]he top 20 patenting regions account for more
than 50% of total world patent applications.”238 Nine of these
regions are in the United States, four in Japan, three in Germany,
one each in France and the Netherlands, and, of course, none in
the developing world.239 According to Primi, “[t]he geography of
innovation is not flat. Certain places, weather regions, cities, or
local clusters tend to agglomerate specific competences, including
scientific and technical knowledge as well as entrepreneurial
capabilities and finance; these stand out as the world’s top
innovation hotspots.”240
Her observations dovetail with the growing volume of research
on the development of high-technology innovation clusters,241
which range from the pioneering work of Alfred Marshall242 to the
widely cited research of Michael Porter.243 Although discussions of
innovation clusters in the United States tend to focus on Silicon
237. Annalisa Primi, The Evolving Geography of Innovation: A Territorial
Perspective, in THE GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2013: THE LOCAL DYNAMICS OF
INNOVATION 69, 70 (2013), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/economics/gii/gii_
2013.pdf.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 70–71.
240. Id. at 70.
241. See supra note 87 (collecting sources discussing the development of
high-technology innovation clusters).
242. See generally ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS: AN
INTRODUCTORY VOLUME (8th ed. 1920) (1890) (providing the seminal text on
neoclassical economics).
243. See generally MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF
NATIONS (1990) (providing a study of international competitiveness based on ten
leading trading nations); MICHAEL E. PORTER, ON COMPETITION (1998) (collecting
Professor Porter’s articles on competitive strategy).
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Valley and Route 128,244 clusters can be found in many other
sectors, such as carpet producers around Dalton, Georgia; jewelry
producers around Providence, Rhode Island; financial services in
New York; the old shoe industry in Massachusetts; and the rubber
industry in Akron, Ohio.245
Indeed, as Paul Krugman concisely noted in the early 1990s,
“economic regions do not respect state boundaries.”246 As he
continued,
Only a few years ago it was common for economic analyses of
increasing returns and trade to assume that external economies
applied at the level of a nation and to assert as their main result
that big countries tend to export goods characterized by
economies of scale. The result may still be true—but it will be
true because national policies make it so, not because there is
anything of inherent economic importance in drawing a line on
the ground and calling the land on either side two different
countries.
All of which leads us to the real reason why national
boundaries matter and to the proper notion of a nation for our
analysis. Nations matter—they exist in a modeling sense—
because they have governments, whose policies affect the
movements of goods and factors. In particular, national
boundaries often act as barriers to trade and factor mobility.
Every modern nation has restrictions on labor mobility. Many
nations place restrictions on the movement of capital, or at least
threaten to do so. And actual or potential limits on trade are
pervasive, in spite of the best efforts of trade negotiators.247

Thus, even though critiques of the “one size fits all” approach
to intellectual property normsetting tend to stop at the national
border, due in large part to the general respect for national
sovereignty, 248 it is important to develop a deeper appreciation of
244. See generally SAXENIAN, supra note 87 (discussing innovation clusters in
the United States such as Silicon Valley and Route 128); Anupam Chander, How
Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY L.J. 639 (2014) (discussing the law’s
significant role in the rise of Silicon Valley as a global trader).
245. See KRUGMAN, GEOGRAPHY AND TRADE, supra note 6, at 53 (listing the
different innovation clusters).
246. Id. at 57; see also FUJITA, KRUGMAN & VENABLES, supra note 6, at 239 (“A
national boundary is . . . a point at which political jurisdictions change. But we
have not put government into our models and will not introduce it here.”).
247. KRUGMAN, GEOGRAPHY AND TRADE, supra note 6, at 71–72.
248. Cf. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir.
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the mismatch between state-based territorial borders and
economic and technological developments at the subnational level.
Such appreciation would lead us to rethink our design of both the
domestic and international intellectual property systems. It would
also compel us to question whether countries should have the same
level of domestic protection throughout, especially when some
regions are clearly more economically and technologically
developed than the others.
B. Across the Border
The second set of issues occurs across the border. The
protection of traditional knowledge and traditional cultural
expressions has been explored for more than two decades even if
one does not go back to the Tunis Model Law on Copyright,249 or
even further to the African Study Conference on Copyright in
Brazzaville in August 1963.250 In September 2000, the
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC) was
established at WIPO.251 This intergovernmental committee aimed
to explore “the development of an international legal instrument
for the effective protection of [traditional knowledge] and
[traditional cultural expressions], and to address the [intellectual
property] aspects of access to and benefit-sharing of [genetic
resources].”252
1956) (underscoring the importance of “considerations of international comity and
respect for national integrity”).
249. TUNIS MODEL LAW ON COPYRIGHT (1976), reprinted in 12 COPYRIGHT:
MONTHLY REV. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 165 (1976); see also Paul Kuruk,
Protecting Folklore Under Modern Intellectual Property Regimes: A Reappraisal
of the Tensions Between Individual and Communal Rights in Africa and the
United States, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 769, 813–17 (1999) (discussing the Tunis Model
Law on Copyright).
250. See Monika Dommann, Lost in Tradition? Reconsidering the History of
Folklore and Its Legal Protection Since 1800, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
TRADITIONAL CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT, supra note 85,
at 3, 9–11 (tracing the protection of folklore back to the African Study Conference
on Copyright in Brazzaville in August 1963); see also Peter K. Yu, A Tale of Two
Development Agendas, 35 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 465, 472–73 (2009) (discussing the
Brazzaville Conference).
251. Yu, Traditional Knowledge, supra note 85, at 239.
252. A New Dawn for Custodians of TK in Africa, WIPO MAG. (Dec. 2010),
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One oft-debated question in this area concerns who should
have power to decide on what materials to protect and how they
should be protected.253 Although this question was once hotly
debated, today’s prevailing—and, most definitely, politically
correct—view is that traditional communities should decide for
themselves. As Erica-Irene Daes, the Special Rapporteur of the
U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities and the chair of its Working Group on
Indigenous Populations, explained,
Indigenous peoples have always had their own laws and
procedures for protecting their heritage and for determining
when and with whom their heritage can be shared. The rules
can be complex and they vary greatly among different
indigenous peoples. To describe these rules thoroughly would be
an almost impossible task; in any case, each indigenous people
must remain free to interpret its own system of laws, as it
understands them.254

Likewise, Angela Riley observed, “[f]or a tribe, determining the
destiny of collective property, particularly that which is sacred and
intended solely for use and practice within the collective, is a
crucial element of self-determination.”255 Rebecca Tsosie also noted
that “indigenous self-determination is best served through an
intercultural framework that acknowledges the autonomy rights
of native peoples.”256
http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2010/06/article_0008.html (last visited
Dec. 6, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review.
253. See Yu, Cultural Relics, supra note 85, at 484–99 (discussing
implementation challenges relating to the mode of protection, the power to define,
the means of identification, and the justifiability of international intervention).
254. See U.N. ECON. & SOC. COUNCIL, SUB-COMM’N ON PREVENTION OF
DISCRIMINATION & PROT. OF MINORITIES, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES: STUDY ON THE PROTECTION OF THE CULTURAL AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 9 (July 28, 1993) (stating that it was prepared
by Erica-Irene Daes, Special Rapporteur and Chairperson of the Working Group
on Indigenous Populations), http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f4380.html; see
also Brendan Tobin, Traditional Knowledge Sovereignty: The Fundamental Role
of Customary Law in Protection of Traditional Knowledge, in INDIGENOUS
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 85, at 565 (discussing the fundamental role
of customary law in protecting traditional knowledge).
255. Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to Intellectual
Property in Indigenous Communities, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, 204–05
(2000).
256. Rebecca Tsosie, International Trade in Indigenous Cultural Heritage: An
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The views of these commentators are consistent with those
drafting the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples. Article 3 of the Declaration states,
“[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”257
Article 11(1) further provides, “[i]ndigenous peoples have the right
to practise and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs.
This includes the right to maintain, protect and develop the past,
present and future manifestations of their cultures, such as
archaeological and historical sites, artefacts, designs, ceremonies,
technologies and visual and performing arts and literature.”258
With respect to traditional knowledge and traditional cultural
expressions, Article 31(1) declares,
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect
and develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and
traditional cultural expressions, as well as the manifestations
of their sciences, technologies and cultures, including human
and genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the
properties of fauna and flora, oral traditions, literatures,
designs, sports and traditional games and visual and
performing arts. They also have the right to maintain, control,
protect and develop their intellectual property over such
cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional
cultural expressions.259

In short, indigenous people and traditional communities are
in the best position to decide for themselves what to protect and
how to protect. Nevertheless, even if we could all agree with this
proposition, difficult questions would still arise when the dispute
involved more than one traditional community. To begin with, due
to reasons ranging from past colonial control to civil wars to
natural calamities, territorial borders do not always match
cultural geography. The former colonies in Africa provide the most
Argument for Indigenous Governance of Cultural Property, in INTERNATIONAL
TRADE IN INDIGENOUS CULTURAL HERITAGE: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 221, 236
(Christoph B. Graber et al. eds., 2012).
257. G.A. Res. 61/295, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples art. 3 (Sept. 13, 2007).
258. Id. art. 11(1).
259. Id. art. 31(1).
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notorious examples. As Harm de Blij observed, “[t]o facilitate
acquisition [of these colonies, European colonial powers] drew
their boundaries point-to-point, often along parallels and
meridians, and not just across deserts, as witness the United
States–Canadian border west of the Great Lakes.”260 Another
oft-cited example concerns the Iroquois (Haudenosaunee) in North
America, whose members “live in two countries, the United States
and Canada, due to an historical division of territory in which the
Iroquois had no voice.”261
Even when one ignores involuntary developments, voluntary
actions could cause a traditional community to split into two or
more groups along geographical lines. For instance, there could be
“family feuds” within a community—such as when the youngsters
disagreed with their elders.262 (The reverse situation—where the
elders disagreed with the youngsters—happens often and is
generally not as troublesome, because tribal law tends to grant
decision-making power to the elders).263 There could also be
internal disagreement within a community, in which the majority
prevails over the minority, or vice versa.264
To complicate matters, there could be more than one
traditional community within a geographical region. There is a
tendency for people to focus on the binary between traditional and
260. DE BLIJ, supra note 22, at 108.
261. Long, supra note 156, at 107.
262. See Ronald Sackville, Legal Protection of Indigenous Culture in
Australia, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 711, 739–40 (2003) (explaining, through
the example of the Australian $10 bank note that reproduced an Aboriginal
artist’s design, that some decisions can only be made by the elders).
263. See OGUAMANAM, supra note 85, at 128 (“In most of Africa, old age is a
synonym for wisdom, an indication of deep spirituality and closeness to the
ancestors.”). But see JARED DIAMOND, THE WORLD UNTIL YESTERDAY: WHAT CAN
WE LEARN FROM TRADITIONAL SOCIETIES? 210–40 (2012) (discussing the diverse
treatments of the elderly in traditional societies).
264. See Yu, Cultural Relics, supra note 85, at 458 (“[T]here may not always
be consensus within a community . . . as to what is or is not acceptable use of
culturally significant images in works intended for commercial sale.” (quoting
WAYNE SHINYA, COPYRIGHT POLICY BRANCH, DEP’T OF CANADIAN HERITAGE,
PROTECTING TRADITIONAL CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS: POLICY ISSUES AND
CONSIDERATIONS FROM A COPYRIGHT PERSPECTIVE 35 (2004))); see also DRAHOS,
supra note 85, at 24 (noting the problems and complications for minority groups
when countries in South East Asia or South Asia, such as India, Indonesia, and
Malaysia, “attempted to characterize their respective populations at large as
indigenous”).
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nontraditional communities, or between indigenous and
nonindigenous communities, assuming that all of those
communities speak with unitary voices. However, this assumption
is not always valid. As Professor Riley reminded us,
[A]lthough many indigenous creations follow the pattern of oral,
inter-generational works, this is not the only model. Many
tribes may, in fact, recognize property interests that are
considered to be more reflective of a “Western” view than an
“indigenous one.” The ways in which indigenous peoples
characterize and define property are as varied as the peoples
themselves, and Westerners must resist the urge to narrow and
define the “indigenous perspective.”265

In addition, “a source community may include dissenting voices,
and a grant of legal protection to those who speak on behalf of the
community may silence those voices—always an issue when rights
are vested in a group rather than an individual.”266
Because traditional knowledge and traditional cultural
expressions often involve intangible materials, “more than one
community [could have made] similar use of the same resources,
sometimes even using the same processes.”267 There have indeed
been disputes among indigenous communities over lineage and
heritage. For example, conflict arose in 1999 “when the National
Park Service concluded that Navajos have a legitimate ‘cultural
affiliation’ with the Anasazi culture of Chaco Canyon National
Monument in northwestern New Mexico.”268 As Michael Brown
explained,
The Anasazi—a name now rejected by Pueblo tribes in favor of
“Ancestral Puebloans”—constructed magnificent cliff dwellings
and multi-storied stone structures that draw thousands of
tourists to Chaco Canyon, Mesa Verde, and other national parks
in the Southwest. Ancestral Puebloans are said to have
vanished in the thirteenth century A.D., but the preponderance
of scientific evidence, which in this case generally agrees with
Pueblo oral history, supports the view that the cliff dwellers
265. Angela R. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the Promise of Globalization: An
Essay on Rights and Responsibilities, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 155, 161 (2004)
(footnote omitted).
266. SUSAN SCAFIDI, WHO OWNS CULTURE?: APPROPRIATION AND AUTHENTICITY
IN AMERICAN LAW xii (2005).
267. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 165, at 957.
268. BROWN, supra note 85, at 20.
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scattered throughout the region to found the communities today
identified as Pueblo. Contemporary Pueblo people react to the
assertion that Navajos have a “cultural affiliation” with the
Anasazi about the same way the Irish would respond to an
English claim of affiliation with pre-sixteenth-century cultural
remains in Ireland.269

To complicate matters, there have been disputes over the
origin of practices and beliefs as well as to whom the sacred places
belong. The Hopis, for instance, have “publicly complained about
non-Hopi (especially Navajo) artists creating what is otherwise
traditionally Hopi art as well as such commercial ventures as a
liquor company decanter in the form of a kachina and a comic book
featuring kachina characters.”270 As an employee of the Hopi
Cultural Preservation Office complained,
The Navajos are taking Hopi qualities, saying that they came
into the fourth world and that they have four sacred colors for
the directions. But those ideas came from us. Now they are
involved in eagle gathering, which is a Hopi practice. We Hopis
don’t talk first in public gatherings anymore. Now we’re afraid
that if we say something, the Navajos will say that it’s theirs
too.271

As if these situations were not complicated enough, the
traditional communities involved could be making competing
claims over something that was actually created by or derived from
a third community, which has yet to be identified, no longer exists,
or chooses to stay neutral.272 A case in point is a sacred bundle held
by the American Museum of Natural History.273 For this bundle,
“Montana, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba Crees are all
269. Id.
270. James D. Nason, Native American Intellectual Property Rights: Issues in
the Control of Esoteric Knowledge, in BORROWED POWER: ESSAYS ON CULTURAL
APPROPRIATION 237, 248 (Bruce Ziff & Pratima V. Rao eds., 1997).
271. BROWN, supra note 85, at 18–19 (internal quotation marks omitted).
272. See Marion P. Forsyth, International Cultural Property Trusts: One
Response to Burden of Proof Challenges in Stolen Antiquities Litigation, 8 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 197, 198 (2007) (noting “the need for a unified claim in American courts
by modern states that share ancient cultural boundaries”).
273. See Sarah Harding, Justifying Repatriation of Native American Cultural
Property, 72 IND. L.J. 723, 724 (1997) (“[A] calico-wrapped sacred bundle that
belonged to Plains Cree Chief Big Bear until his death. The sacred bundle was
given to the institution fifty years ago by an unnamed native with the instructions
‘keep it well.’”).
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independently claiming ownership as is the adopted
great-great-grandson of Plains Cree Chief Big Bear. Determining
who owned the bundle after Big Bear’s death, and thus whether
the transfer was legitimate, will not be an easy task.”274
Given these many complications, the challenge of figuring out
who can decide on the treatment of traditional knowledge and
traditional cultural expressions in a geographical region can be
quite daunting. As important as it is, determining whether we
should defer to the choices of traditional communities is only the
beginning of the inquiry, not the end. In a dispute involving two or
more traditional communities, invoking the right to
self-determination is unlikely to result in a satisfactory resolution.
As Richard Ford explained,
[W]hy should area X be the relevant community, when area X
plus Y might provide an equally or more valid definition of
community? The answer cannot appeal to the right of
community self-determination: if the people in area Y claim to
be part of a larger community, X plus Y, then should their
opinion not be considered as well as that of the people in area
X?275

Consider the early example concerning the disagreement
between two groups within a traditional community.276 Although
strong claims can be made to ensure that the group in the original
geographical location determines for the community, it is hard to
ignore the important countervailing interests of the departing
group—either because they do not have the numbers to prevail in
a majority contest or because they have chosen to leave. To some
extent, this departing group—either as prior users or continuing
innovators—deserves some form of protection (such as “the
continuation of bona fide prior use”).277
274. Id.
275. Richard T. Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal
Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1843, 1860 (1994).
276. See supra notes 261–266 and accompanying text.
277. See Antony Taubman, Saving the Village: Conserving Jurisprudential
Diversity in the International Protection of Traditional Knowledge, in
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A
GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 521, 545 (Keith E. Maskus &
Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005) (providing for an exception “for the continuation
of bona fide prior use” in the traditional knowledge regime).
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Moreover, if this departing group continues to maintain a
traditional lifestyle,278 the use of traditional materials will remain
important to its members, regardless of the overall group size. In
addition, the heritage of the community (before the split) will
always remain part of the departing group’s cultural heritage. Just
because the group is no longer part of the community does not
mean that the group members should also give up their heritage.
In sum, the mismatch between political and cultural
geography has generated many challenging questions. It is
therefore no surprise that after more than a decade and a half, the
WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore still has
not been able to develop formal instruments on genetic resources,
traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions.279
Although leaders from developing countries, indigenous peoples,
and traditional communities have often complained about the lack
of political will on the part of developed countries to reach
international consensus,280 the standard-setting challenges in this
rather controversial area should not be underestimated.
278. See generally DIAMOND, supra note 263 (examining and reflecting on the
different ways of life in traditional societies).
279. See Catherine Saez, Revised Articles Protecting Folklore Head to WIPO
General Assembly, for Better or Worse, INTELLECTUAL PROP. WATCH (June 19,
2017), https://www.ip-watch.org/2017/06/19/revised-articles-protecting-folklorehead-wipo-general-assembly-better-worse/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2017) (reporting
the 34th IGC session in Geneva on June 12–16, 2017) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); see generally Intergovernmental Comm. on Intellectual
Prop. & Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge & Folklore, World Intellectual
Prop. Org. [IGC], Consolidated Document Relating to Intellectual Property and
Genetic Resources, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/34/4 (Mar. 15, 2017) (providing
a consolidated document regarding a potential international instrument on
genetic resources); IGC, The Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions: Draft
Articles, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/34/8 (June 15, 2017) (providing the draft
text of a potential international instrument on traditional cultural expressions);
IGC, The Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Draft Articles, WIPO Doc.
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/34/5 (Mar. 15, 2017) (providing the draft text of a potential
international instrument on traditional knowledge).
280. As Professor Coombe noted,
Although indigenous peoples are now recognized as key actors in this
global dialogue, it will need to be expanded to encompass a wider range
of principles and priorities, which will eventually encompass political
commitments to indigenous peoples’ rights of self-determination. Only
when indigenous peoples are full partners in this dialogue, with full
juridical standing and only when . . . their cultural world views,
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Even if nationwide solutions are developed through
international treaties, the complications caused by uneven
subnational developments, as discussed in the previous Subpart,281
may still arise. After all, the protection of traditional knowledge
and traditional cultural expressions is one area in which the
minority needs protection even without the support of the
majority. That many countries have suffered from colonization has
made the protection of indigenous and traditional communities
especially important. After all, these communities are unlikely to
have considerable political power within their own country.282
Moreover, political geography changes with time even when
cultural development does not always respect the territorial
boundaries set arbitrarily by powerful political actors.283
customary laws, and ecological practices are recognized as
fundamental contributions to resolving local social justice concerns will
we be engaged in anything we can genuinely call a dialogue.
Rosemary J. Coombe, The Recognition of Indigenous Peoples’ and Community
Traditional Knowledge in International Law, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 275, 284–85
(2001); see also SARA BANNERMAN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND ACCESS TO
KNOWLEDGE 187 (2015) (noting “[t]he long absence of indigenous peoples’ voices
from international norm-setting”); Tom Greaves, IPR, A Current Survey, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, A SOURCEBOOK 1, 14
(Tom Greaves ed., 1994) (“In most African states . . . the larger tribal societies
see[] themselves as rightful elements of the nation’s government. Owning their
cultural knowledge is not the issue, owning a share of the central government
is.”); Dean B. Suagee, The Cultural Heritage of American Indian Tribes and the
Preservation of Biological Diversity, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 483, 488 (1999) (noting that
“the most effective way to make use of their traditional ecological knowledge is to
recognize the rights of indigenous peoples to govern their own territories”).
281. Supra Part IV.A.
282. See KEITH AOKI, SEED WARS: CONTROVERSIES AND CASES ON PLANT
GENETIC RESOURCES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 92 (2008) (noting that it is not
difficult to “imagine situations where the interests of subnational groups,
communities or tribes are at loggerheads with state interests”); see also Alexander
A. Bauer, New Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property: A Critical Appraisal of
the Antiquities Trade Debates, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 690, 703 (2008) (noting that
“many countries contain minority communities whose interests are not always
served by their national governments”).
283. See Penny English, Space and Time: The Genius Loci of Ancient Places,
in LAW AND GEOGRAPHY, supra note 57, at 465, 467 (“Not only are people
dislocated from place in modern Western society but a parallel dislocation from
time has also taken place, resulting in a world which is characterized by
disconnection from fixed temporal as well as spatial certainties.”); Paul Street,
Spaces of Diversity in Diverse Spaces, in LAW AND GEOGRAPHY, supra note 57, at
323, 340
[P]eople’s physical proximity to one another does not mean that they
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C. Beyond the Border
The final set of issues occurs at the global level. These issues
happen not only across the border, but often both across and
beyond the border. They are global, as opposed to international.
Although law is territorial in nature and scope, its protection has
now gone beyond territorial borders, thanks to the rise of
transnational corporations and their active deployment of
contracts and technological measures.284
The example I use repeatedly to illustrate the challenge of
matching legal protection to political geography is region-lockout
codes.285 Although DVD region codes have provided a textbook
illustration of the use of geographical restrictions to protect
copyrighted content, region-based restrictions can be found on
many other consumer products, including those developed before
the digital age (such as power plugs and sockets).286 Today, region
codes have been widely used to protect not only movies and
television shows, but also music, computer software, online games,
and, surprisingly, even printer toner cartridges.287 When keyed to
will inherently either all share the same knowledge about their
locality, or perceive of their locality in the same way, for each
inhabitant of a given place is also at the intersection of multiple
diasporic communities, communities that have their own bodies of local
knowledge, though not necessarily local to place. In other words, while
we may write of local knowledge as that which shares the same
vernacular, this cannot and should not be equated with geophysical
localities or places.
284. See Peter K. Yu, Five Disharmonizing Trends in the International
Intellectual Property Regime, in 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION
WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 73, 91–96 (Peter K. Yu ed.,
2007) (discussing the trend of rights holders using mass-market contracts and
technological protection measures).
285. See Peter K. Yu, Region Codes and the Territorial Mess, 30 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 187 (2012) (discussing region-based lockout codes, with a focus on
DVD region codes).
286. See International Standardization of Electrical Plugs and Sockets for
Domestic Use, INT’L ELEC. COMM’N, http://www.iec.ch/worldplugs/history.htm
(last visited Nov. 23, 2017) (describing the history of electrical sockets around the
world) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
287. See Stefan Bechtold, The Present and Future of Digital Rights
Management—Musings on Emerging Legal Problems, in DIGITAL RIGHTS
MANAGEMENT: TECHNOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS 597,
628 (Eberhard Becker et al. eds., 2003) (stating that regional playback control
“can be found in Sony’s PlayStation game consoles and in various software
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local wireless providers, lockout codes have also been successfully
deployed in cell phones to provide geographical restrictions, even
though these codes technically do not have the same design and
functionality as DVD region codes.288
More recently, a growing number of YouTube accounts have
imposed geographical restrictions to prevent viewers from having
access to all content, thereby taking away YouTube’s earlier
strength as a region-free platform for disseminating and viewing
content.289 Apple’s iTunes Store “has [also] established different
pricing structures for different countries; their [digital rights
management] protects against consumer arbitrage, and their
servers ensure that anyone trying to log onto, say, the U.S. iTunes
website from a U.K. computer will be automatically redirected to
the British site.”290 In addition, to meet user needs and to ensure
data retention in a contracted-for location, providers of cloud
computing services have begun to introduce the so-called regional
cloud, or cloud services within a “regional zone.”291 In short,
applications” (footnote omitted)); Vinelli, supra note 117, at 137;
Familiar examples abound in our technology-orientated world:
consumer movies (DVDs and Blu-Ray discs), printers, video games
(Personal Computer video games, Microsoft’s Xbox and Xbox 360, and
Sony’s PlayStation 2 and 3), and cell phones (most notably Apple’s
iPhone series) . . . . Even ink-jet printers and ink cartridges have been
subject to region coding technology.
(footnote omitted). Michelle Griffin, Forced on to the Internet, AGE
(Melbourne), Jan. 8, 2011, at 20 (noting that “the sluggish distribution deals
of local record companies ensure that Australians can’t enjoy legal music
streaming sites such as Spotify and Pandora”).
288. See Vinelli, supra note 117, at 139
Cell phones in the United States are programmed in a way that
segments the market along the lines of a wireless provider, a practice
known as “locking” the phone, rather than by geographic region. A
locked cell phone only works on a pre-defined carrier’s network or
within a specific territory.
(footnote omitted).
289. See Yu, supra note 285, at 257 (“Even YouTube has begun to impose
territorial restrictions to prevent viewers from having access to all content. These
geographical restrictions indeed have taken away a major benefit of using
YouTube as a region-free platform for disseminating and viewing content.”).
290. TARLETON GILLESPIE, WIRED SHUT: COPYRIGHT AND THE SHAPE OF DIGITAL
CULTURE 267 (2007).
291. See Simon Bradshaw et al., Standard Contracts for Cloud Services, in
CLOUD COMPUTING LAW, supra note 89, at 55 (“Some major cloud providers, such
as Amazon, offer ‘regional zones’ in which a customer may be assured that data

A SPATIAL CRITIQUE

2111

geographical restrictions are now ubiquitous; they can be found in
not only consumer goods but also streaming platforms and cloud
services.
The rationale for recreating territorial boundaries—or
“reterritorialization”292—through the use of technology is not hard
to understand. The introduction of the Internet and other new
communications
technologies
has
greatly
eroded—or
“deterritorialized”293—the traditional boundaries used to protect
intellectual property rights. As Sir Robin Jacob, a former Lord
Justice of Appeal, declared in the early 2000s, “as time goes
on, . . . the world will realize that at least for intellectual property
the days of the nation-state are over.”294
To be certain, there are many justifications for
reterritorialization through the use of technology, contracts, and
other legal or quasi-legal tools. For instance, geographically based
restrictions facilitate the sequential distribution of entertainment
and media products.295 Due to geography—or the “tyranny of
distance”296—actors, directors, and producers cannot promote
entertainment projects around the world at the same time.297
Because the northern hemisphere enjoys summer when the
will remain.”); W. Kuan Hon & Christopher Millard, How Do Restrictions on
International Transfers of Personal Data Work in Clouds?, in CLOUD COMPUTING
LAW, supra note 89, at 254, 274–75 (discussing “regional clouds”).
292. DAVID DELANEY, TERRITORY: A SHORT INTRODUCTION 2 (2008).
293. Id. at 15.
294. Justice Jacob, International Intellectual Property Litigation in the Next
Millennium, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 507, 516 (2000).
295. See Yu, Towards Seamless Global Distribution, supra note 140, at 188–
89 (discussing the application of geographically based restrictions to facilitate
sequential media distribution).
296. GEOFFREY BLAINEY, THE TYRANNY OF DISTANCE: HOW DISTANCE SHAPED
AUSTRALIA’S HISTORY (1966).
297. See Claude E. Barfield & Mark A. Groombridge, The Economic Case for
Copyright Owner Control over Parallel Imports, 1 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 903,
929 (1998) (noting that in the film industry, a product may be introduced
sequentially in order to take advantage of a publicity tour by a film star); Brian
Hu, Closed Borders and Open Secrets: Regional Lockout, the Film Industry, and
Code-Free
DVD
Players,
MEDIASCAPE,
http://www.tft.ucla.edu/mediascape/archive/volume01/number02/reviews/hu.htm
(last visited Dec. 6, 2017) (“Actors cannot be everywhere at once to publicize a
new film.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Yu, supra note
285, at 201 (“[D]irectors, actors, and writers need to travel from one region to
another to promote the movie.”).
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southern hemisphere experiences winter, producers may also need
to select different release times to match viewer experience and
thereby maximize profits.298
In addition, geographical restrictions allow rights holders to
undertake the practice of price discrimination,299 which enables
them to “charge[] a high price to high valuation users and a low
price to low valuation users.”300 These restrictions also facilitate
distribution and licensing arrangements, which may vary across
the world or from region to region.301 Even better, geographical
restrictions respond to the considerably diverse international
regulatory standards302 while at the same time helping to address
piracy and counterfeiting problems in certain parts of the world,
most notably China and Southeast Asia.303
298. See Yu, supra note 285, at 201 (“[A] summer movie shown in the United
States during the July 4 weekend may have weak ticket sales in Australia and
New Zealand if shown at the same time; the Southern hemisphere is still in the
middle of winter at that time.”).
299. See HAROLD L. VOGEL, ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY ECONOMICS: A GUIDE
FOR FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 126 (8th ed. 2011) (“Sequencing is always a marketing
decision that attempts to maximize income, and it is generally sensible for
profit-maximizing distributors to price-discriminate in different markets or
‘windows’ by selling the same product at different prices to different buyers.”);
Rostam J. Neuwirth, The Fragmentation of the Global Market: The Case of Digital
Versatile Discs (DVDs), 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 409, 422–23 (2009) (stating
that the use of DVD region codes “allows—in line with the governing laws and
regulations of the place—charging different prices in different markets for the
same product”); Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-Anticircumvention, 84
DENV. U. L. REV. 13, 75 (2006) (noting that DVD region codes “facilitate price
discrimination”).
300. Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy:
Copyright Protection of Digital Works, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 845, 850 (1997).
301. See JIM TAYLOR ET AL., DVD DEMYSTIFIED 5–19 (3d ed. 2006) (“The
primary reason for regional management is to preserve exclusive distribution
arrangements with local distributors.”); see also Yu, supra note 285, at 209–13
(discussing the different international distribution and licensing arrangements
made by movie studios).
302. See Neuwirth, supra note 299, at 426 (“Since films are released in
different versions in different countries, restrictions on the parallel importation
of DVDs are a means for protecting the DVD version which was authorised by the
national broadcasting authority of the respective country.”); Yu, supra note 285,
at 213 (noting “the practical needs created by the considerable divergences in film
ratings and regulatory standards across the world”); Caitlin Fitzsimmons,
Restricting DVDs “Illegal” Warns ACCC, AUSTRALIAN IT, Mar. 27, 2001, at 33
(explaining how DVD region codes enable movie producers to comply with
national censorship ratings).
303. See Fitzsimmons, supra note 302, at 33 (“South-East Asia and China
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Notwithstanding these justifications, questions arise when
one takes a deeper look at the underlying geographical conditions.
Those questions are particularly obvious when different
geographical locations are lumped together under arbitrary
regions such as those recognized through DVD region codes, as
opposed to geographical proxies of a finer grain, such as Internet
Protocol addresses now used in many online platforms.304
Consider, for example, the countries included in Region 4 as
recognized through DVD region codes, which covers “Australia,
New Zealand, and Latin America (including Mexico).”305 Included
in this region are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, and Haiti.306
Despite their being lumped together for content protection,
cultural geography has revealed very limited similarities between
them. In fact, the linguistic contrasts between them cannot be
starker. The majority of Argentines, Australians, Brazilians, and
Haitians speak Spanish, English, Portuguese, and French,
respectively.307
Even if we ignore the countries’ cultural and linguistic
differences, it is hard to imagine how grouping these highly
divergent economies together under one region-based lockout code
would promote effective price discrimination. Australia is a
member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development.308 According to the 2015 World Bank indicators, its
each had their own regions because of rampant piracy.”).
304. See Derek E. Bambauer, Pangloss’s Copyright, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 265, 267 (2012) (“Services such as Hulu and Spotify use a consumer’s Internet
Protocol . . . address as a proxy for geographic location. They will refuse to stream
content to a location where the content owner has not authorized distribution.”);
Yu, supra note 285, at 258–59 (noting “the potential for using finer-grained
technology [than DVD region codes] to provide the benefits of region-based
restrictions” but questioning the effectiveness of such technology).
305. Yu, supra note 285, at 194.
306. See id. (listing Argentina, Australia, Brazil, and Haiti within Region 4).
307. See
The
World
Factbook,
CENT.
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2098.html
(last visited Nov. 23, 2017) (listing countries’ spoken languages by percentage)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
308. See List of OECD Member Countries—Ratification of the Convention on
the
OECD,
ORG.
ECON.
CO-OPERATION
&
DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/list-oecd-membercountries.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2017) (listing Australia as an OECD member)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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GDP amounted to over $1.34 trillion.309 By contrast, Haiti, another
country in Region 4, had a GDP of only $8.77 billion, less than one
percent of Australia’s GDP.310 Given the significant difference in
economic power between these two countries, there is a very strong
likelihood that many Haitians cannot afford those DVDs that
Australian consumers find appealing.
When one focuses on Region 5, which covers “Eastern Europe,
Russia, India, and Africa (except Egypt and South Africa),”311 the
geographically based problems with DVD region codes become
even more blatant. This region includes not only two BRICS
countries312 (India and Russia), but also some members of the
European Union. Except for Egypt and South Africa, the region
also covers all countries in Africa.313 In terms of political, economic,
or cultural geography, the group of countries included in Region 5
simply makes no sense. To put it bluntly, this region seems to be
the “grab bag” region about which Hollywood simply does not care
much. To a large extent, it reflects the same problematic mentality
many U.S. entertainment lawyers have over the term “R.O.W.”314
As noted music lawyer Donald Passman observed, in his usual
tongue-in-cheek style, “R.O.W. stands for rest of world and means
the grab bag of countries left over, which I’ll leave to you and
Google Maps to name.”315

309. See
Data:
GDP
(Current
US$),
WORLD
BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2015 (last visited
Nov. 23, 2017) (listing GDP by country in current U.S. dollars) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
310. Id.
311. Yu, supra note 285, at 194.
312. The BRICS countries include Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South
Africa. For discussions of these countries, see generally BRICS AND DEVELOPMENT
ALTERNATIVES: INNOVATION SYSTEMS AND POLICIES (Jose Cassiolato & Virginia
Vitorino eds., 2011); ANDREW F. COOPER, THE BRICS: A VERY SHORT
INTRODUCTION (2016); JIM O’NEILL, THE GROWTH MAP: ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY IN
THE BRICS AND BEYOND (2011); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property Negotiations,
the BRICS Factor and the Changing North–South Debate, in THE
BRICS-LAWYERS’ GUIDE TO GLOBAL COOPERATION 148 (Rostam Neuwirth et al.
eds., 2017); Yu, supra note 170.
313. Yu, supra note 285, at 194.
314. See DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC
BUSINESS 142 (9th ed. 2015) (discussing the term).
315. Id.
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As if these problems were not bad enough, DVD region codes
ignore the continued geographical flow of people caused and
accelerated by globalization, improved transportation, increased
travel, and enhanced communication.316 As a result, these
arbitrarily set region-based restrictions have created considerable
inconvenience for tourists, business travelers, expatriate workers,
and foreign students.317 They have also posed insensitive barriers
to immigrant families and foreign students who seek to use DVDs
to teach or learn foreign languages.318
There are additional questions concerning whether
geographical restrictions have become obsolete in an environment
where a growing number of movies and television shows are now
being released worldwide on the same day.319 Known commonly as
“day and date” release, this distribution practice was introduced to
address the problems brought by massive digital piracy320 and the
inevitable availability of photos, spoilers, and reviews on websites
and social media.321 Although “day and date” release started with
316. See Yu, supra note 285, at 217 (“With increased globalization and
frequent consumer travel, a model that conditions the enjoyment of digital
content on the place of purchase is seriously outdated.”).
317. See id. (discussing how DVD region codes have inconvenienced tourists,
business travelers, expatriate workers, and foreign students).
318. See id. at 227–28 (discussing how DVD region codes affect not only
foreign students and immigrant families, but also domestic students who are
eager to learn foreign languages).
319. See Bruce Orwall & Evan Ramstad, Web’s Reach Forces Hollywood to
Rethink America-First Policy, WALL ST. J., http://online.wsj.com/article/SB9607
6055497278634.html (last updated June 12, 2000) (last visited Nov. 23, 2017) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)
Hollywood is rushing toward all-at-once global distribution for many
films. The major studios have occasionally distributed films this way
in the past, notably big productions with bankable stars. But the
exception is now morphing into the rule, continuing the evolution of a
global entertainment culture manufactured by and launched from the
U.S.
320. See Hu, supra note 297, at 4 (“Studios are reducing geographic windows
primarily to diminish the appeal of piracy: if films are immediately released in
theaters, consumers are less likely to buy pirated DVDs and VCDs [video compact
discs] or download bootlegged films online.”).
321. See Yu, Seamless Global Digital Marketplace, supra note 140, at 269
(“[A]fter the content has been shown anywhere in the world, photos, spoilers and
reviews will inevitably appear on websites and social media. The disclosure of
such content is particularly harmful to those movies and TV programs that
depend on witty dialogues, plot twists or surprise elements.”); Emily Dunt et al.,
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blockbuster movies,322 it has since been expanded to other types of
works and across Internet platforms from around the world.323 As
Jim Taylor, an expert on DVD region codes, presciently observed,
“[a]s the Internet breaks down national boundaries of commerce,
and as digital cinema allows movies to debut in theaters worldwide
at the same time, region codes will become mostly irrelevant.”324
In sum, the design of legal protection can benefit from greater
geographical insights and spatial analysis. Today, people are no
longer content with just watching programs on television or
listening to CDs at home. Instead, they listen to music stored in
the cloud when they travel, watch foreign television shows
recommended by distant friends, and generate mash-ups of
worldwide digital content. Any laws that fail to accommodate these
geographically dispersed activities and the related consumer
expectations will quickly become obsolete.

The Economic Consequences of DVD Regional Restrictions, ECON. PAPERS: J.
APPLIED ECON. & POL’Y, Mar. 2002, at 32, 40 (“The rise of news and marketing
over the Internet compromises the effective execution of staggered marketing
campaigns for films across the globe.”); Neuwirth, supra note 299, at 422 (“The
delay in the global release dates of a movie should become shorter because
awareness of audiences in other countries is greater since they may read about
the release of a film on the Internet.”); Yu, supra note 285, at 205 (“[T]he
availability of spoilers over the Internet and the unavoidable discussion of movie
content could take away the attraction of seeing the movie for the first time in a
cinema. This is particularly true for those movies that include witty dialogues,
plot twists, and surprise elements.”); Orwall & Ramstad, supra note 319
Regardless of where they live, today’s movie fans can use the Web to
access the movie-marketing materials that flood the U.S. before a film’s
release. Right now, they are watching Internet trailers for not just U.S.
summer releases, but also next holiday season’s offerings . . . . And
they are keeping tabs on future films via movie-gossip Web sites . . . .
322. See Hu, supra note 297, at 4 (noting in the mid-2000s that “only the most
high-profile films (Lord of the Rings, Harry Potter) are released day-and-date
around the world”).
323. See, e.g., Fox Sets Simultaneous Global Launch for Marvel’s “The Gifted,”
VARIETY (Oct. 2, 2017, 5:00 AM), http://variety.com/2017/tv/news/the-giftedmarvel-fox-day-and-date-global-launch-1202577491/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2017)
(reporting that Marvel’s The Gifted “is rolling out virtually day-and-date in 183
countries across 21st Century Fox’s vast collection of Fox-branded international
channels”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
324. TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 301, at 12–20.
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V. A Two-Way Dialogue
The previous Part has highlighted the geographical
complexities in issues occurring inside the border, across the
border, and beyond the border. Indirectly, it has also shown how a
more geographically informed analysis can improve the
development of intellectual property law and policy. Although it is
almost impossible to outline all the different ways to inject
geographical insights and spatial analysis into intellectual
property law and policy, this Part underscores the importance of
engaging in a two-way dialogue between intellectual property and
geography.325
To help facilitate this dialogue, this Part utilizes what
Nicholas Blomley, a founding father of critical legal geography, has
described as “legalizing space” and “spatializing law.”326 As Jean
Carmalt elaborated, “[t]he difference between the two terms is
important: the first focuses on the way that law plays a role in
producing space and spatial relationships, while the second
provides a critical analysis of the assumptions about space, spatial
relationships, and geography that are embedded in law and legal
practice.”327
This Part begins by discussing how law can be spatialized,
that is, how “we can question, critique, and hopefully rewrite
spatial assumptions that are built into specific laws.”328 It then
discusses the different tools and devices that can be used to help
provide legal recognition or regulation of spaces, or spatial
interests, in the intellectual property arena. For illustrative
purposes, this discussion will focus on those three sets of issues
Part IV has explored—those occurring inside the border, across the
325. See Braverman et al., supra note 60, at 1 (noting “the interconnections
between law and spatiality, and especially their reciprocal construction” and the
“aspects of the social that are analytically identified as either legal or spatial are
conjoined and co-constituted”); Gordon L. Clark, Foreword to LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES
READER, supra note 54, at x, xi (“[T]o a geographical analyst, the link between
legal principles and local circumstance is hardly a one-way street.”).
326. Nicholas Blomley, From “What” to “So What”: Law and Geography in
Retrospect, in LAW AND GEOGRAPHY, supra note 57, at 17, 24, 27.
327. Jean Carmalt, International Law as Process: Human Rights in Context:
International Law and Spatial Injustice in New Orleans, Louisiana, 63 STUD. L.,
POL. & SOC’Y 147, 149 (2014).
328. Id.
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border, and beyond the border. By bringing together these two
approaches, this Part aims to demonstrate that the interaction
between the two interconnected fields of intellectual property and
geography should be conducted as a two-way dialogue, not a
monologue.
A. Spatializing Law
As intellectual property laws and policies continue to develop,
we will need to acquire a better understanding of the principle of
territoriality. There is no denying that intellectual property rights
have been territorial in nature and scope.329 Yet, it remains highly
debatable as to how territoriality is defined.
When territoriality questions arise, there is an immediate
tendency to recall the independence-of-right doctrine.330 Under
this doctrine, rights holders do not have unitary protection
throughout the world.331 Instead, they obtain nation-based rights
in countries such as Australia, Brazil, or China.332 What type of
rights they obtain, how strong these rights will be, and whether
these rights are to be effectively enforced depend largely on the
intellectual property system each country has put in place.333
Thus far, the continued national divergences in laws, policies,
and institutions have created a “territorial mess” that greatly
hinders the global protection of intellectual property rights.334 This
329. See supra Part III.A (discussing the territorial nature and scope of
intellectual property rights).
330. See Yu, supra note 285, at 188 (“Copyright holders cannot yet obtain
unitary protection throughout the world. Instead, they obtain rights in Australia,
Brazil, China, France, South Africa, and the United States.”).
331. See id. (noting that the scope and extent of protection will “depend
largely on the intellectual property system each individual country has put in
place”).
332. See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 155 (2d Cir. 2007)
Precisely because a trademark has a separate legal existence under
each country’s laws, ownership of a mark in one country does not
automatically confer upon the owner the exclusive right to use that
mark in another country. Rather, a mark owner must take the proper
steps to ensure that its rights to that mark are recognized in any
country in which it seeks to assert them.
333. See Yu, supra note 285, at 188.
334. See id. (noting that “copyright holders seeking to protect their works in
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mess is further exacerbated by additional differences in market
capacities and consumer expectations.335 To address this ongoing
challenge, countries have worked hard to harmonize their laws
through the development of international intellectual property
agreements, including the Paris and Berne Conventions, the
TRIPS Agreement, and WIPO-administered treaties.336 Article
5(2) of the Berne Convention, for instance, expressly states,
The enjoyment and the exercise of these rights . . . shall be
independent of the existence of protection in the country of
origin of the work. Consequently, apart from the provisions of
this Convention, the extent of protection, as well as the means
of redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall be
governed exclusively by the laws of the country where
protection is claimed.337

While the need and vitality of the independence-of-right
doctrine seems obvious, due to the fact that state sovereignty is the
source of national laws and policies,338 there is a different set of
territoriality questions that can benefit from greater geographical
insights and spatial analysis.339 This latter set covers the
multiple markets remain frustrated by the ‘territorial mess’ created by national
divergences in laws, policies, and institutions, not to mention the additional
differences in market capacities and consumer expectations”); see also Yu, supra
note 37, at 943 (noting “the ‘messiness’ of international intellectual property
law”).
335. See Graeme W. Austin, The Inevitability of “Territoriality Challenges” in
Trademark Law, in TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND TERRITORIALITY CHALLENGES IN
A GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 156, at 1, 1 (“Because the sources that shape the
human consciousness do not begin and end at a nation’s borders, tensions will
inevitably arise between trademark law’s territoriality principle and the realities
of consumer perceptions and behaviors.”).
336. See, e.g., WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 105-17, at v (1997) (providing international minimum standards for copyright
protection in the digital environment); WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, at 18 (1997) (providing
international minimum standards for the protection of performances and
phonograms in the digital environment).
337. Berne Convention, supra note 79, art. 5(2).
338. See supra note 214 (collecting sources discussing state sovereignty as the
predominant source of national laws and policies).
339. See Frederick M. Abbott, Seizure of Generic Pharmaceuticals in Transit
Based on Allegations of Patent Infringement: A Threat to International Trade,
Development and Public Welfare, 1 WIPO J. 43, 44 (2009) (noting the difference
between the territoriality and independence of intellectual property); Yu,
Towards Seamless Global Distribution, supra note 140, at 184–86 (calling for
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territorial reach of the prescriptive jurisdiction and the scope of the
relevant laws.340 Both issues are usually resolved at the discretion
of nation-based institutions, such as the legislature or the
judiciary. Under U.S. case law, for example, federal statutes are
not to be construed to apply to conduct abroad absent clear
congressional intent to that effect.341 Thus, courts are generally
reluctant to apply intellectual property laws to infringing activities
outside the United States unless there is direct infringement
within the country.342
The seminal case in this area is the 1994 case of Subafilms,
Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co.343 In this case, Subafilms
and Hearst Corporation sued MGM/UA for the unauthorized
foreign distribution of Yellow Submarine, an animated film
greater distinction between these two different sets of territoriality questions);
see also Dinwoodie, supra note 57, at 887–88 (“Disaggregating the ‘principle of
territoriality’ into its component parts, and separately analyzing the doctrines
that implement the principle, enables a more nuanced assessment of the ways in
which the principle might be modified in an era of global trade.”).
340. See Trimble, supra note 96, at 205 (“The increasing interest in
cross-border aspects of [intellectual property] litigation, observable in recent
years, has focused on two types of issues: establishing the territorial scope of
substantive [intellectual property] laws on the one hand and designing and
applying conflict of laws rules in [intellectual property] cases on the other.”).
341. As the United States Supreme Court declared in Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission v. Arabian American Oil Co.:
It is a longstanding principle of American law “that legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” This “canon of
construction . . . is a valid approach whereby unexpressed
congressional intent may be ascertained.” It serves to protect against
unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which
could result in international discord.
499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949));
see also Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) (stating
that a federal statute should be constructed in a way that is “confined in its
operation and effect to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general
and legitimate power”); Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights
in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505, 510–19 (1997) (discussing the courts’
general presumption against the exterritorial application of U.S. law).
342. See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1097
(9th Cir. 1994) (noting that “[t]he application of American copyright law to acts of
infringement that occur entirely overseas clearly could have th[e] effect [of
disrupting Congress’s efforts to secure a more stable international intellectual
property regime]”).
343. 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994).
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inspired by the Beatles.344 Interpreting the U.S. Copyright Act as
conferring rights no further than the national border, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that authorizing
within the United States acts that occur entirely abroad did not
violate domestic copyright law.345
After Subafilms, however, several courts declined to follow the
Ninth Circuit’s decision, maintaining that the court had ignored
changing economic reality, technological conditions, and consumer
expectations.346 Instead, they sought to justify the application of
344. Id. at 1089.
345. See id. at 1099 (holding that “the mere authorization of acts of
infringement that are not cognizable under the United States copyright laws
because they occur entirely outside of the United States does not state a claim for
infringement under the Copyright Act”).
346. As the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee
declared:
[P]iracy has changed since the Barbary days. Today, the raider need
not grab the bounty with his own hands; he need only transmit his goahead by wire or telefax to start the presses in a distant land.
Subafilms ignores this economic reality, and the economic incentives
underpinning the Copyright Clause designed to encourage creation of
new works, and transforms infringement of the authorization right
into a requirement of domestic presence by a primary infringer. Under
this view, a phone call to Nebraska results in liability; the same phone
call to France results in riches. In a global marketplace, it is literally a
distinction without a difference.
A better view, one supported by the text, the precedents, and,
ironically enough, the legislative history to which the Subafilms court
cited, would be to hold that domestic violation of the authorization
right is an infringement, sanctionable under the Copyright Act,
whenever the authorizee has committed an act that would violate the
copyright owner’s § 106 rights.
Curb v. MCA Records, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 586, 595 (M.D. Tenn. 1995); see also
Expediters Int’l v. Direct Line Cargo Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 995 F. Supp. 468, 477
(D.N.J. 1998) (“To allow an entity to curtail [copyright] by merely directing its
foreign agent to do its ‘dirty work’ would be to hinder the deterrent effect of the
statute and to thwart its underlying purpose.”). Similarly, Jane Ginsburg
lamented:
When foreign users log onto the U.S. site and download copies to their
computers outside the United States, these acts could be characterized
as further reproductions made from the illicit master copy on the U.S.
website, and thus within the scope of U.S. law, as the Second Circuit
has articulated the law’s reach. Alternatively, applying the Ninth
Circuit’s approach, one might view the website as an invitation
(“authorization”) to all Internet users to access the document and
produce copies. U.S. downloads would be governed by U.S. law (that
would be true were the server located in the United Kingdom as well),
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U.S. law by identifying some connection between the infringing act
and the U.S. territory.347 In doing so, they not only strengthened
the protection of U.S. copyrighted works abroad, but also removed
what they considered the territoriality-based barrier to copyright
protection.
Like the first set of questions about the independence-of-right
doctrine, this second set covers important issues about the
territoriality of rights. Unlike the former, however, the latter
depends less on political geography and allows for greater
utilization of geographical insights and spatial analysis. In fact, if
we are to fully determine the territorial scope of intellectual
property rights, we will need to know more than the country from
which these rights originate. We may also need to think more
deeply about the relationship between space and time,348 including
changes in economic conditions, technological capabilities, and
but foreign downloads, since they “culminate” off shore, would be
subject to the law of the place of receipt.
Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Without Borders? Choice of Forum and Choice of
Law for Copyright Infringement in Cyberspace, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 153,
171 (1997).
347. See Curb, 898 F. Supp. at 596 (“Because . . . issues of fact remain with
regard to domestic infringement and authorization, the Court need not reach the
question of whether domestic or foreign law may be applied to ultimately resolve
the question of infringement.”).
348. See generally English, supra note 283 (exploring the relationship
between space and time). As Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann explained:
All notions of space and time are social constructions, whether defined
by social, economic, or political relations and units or by reference to
physical (e.g., ecological, hydrological) characteristics. There is no
unique, theoretically superior substantive definition. Any primacy
given to a particular type of time and space reflects the pragmatic
political or theoretical and methodological purposes for which they are
selected. The choice of a certain spatiotemporality is not innocent with
respect to the social relations that are thereby highlighted or rendered
invisible (e.g., the spatiotemporality of many women’s lives, colonized
subjects, and the like). Natural and physical scientists tend to define
space in terms of physical criteria whereby, for example, territorial,
property, or administrative spaces and scales become secondary,
subject to definition of space in terms of physical characteristics. For
social scientists, social, political, or administrative demarcations of
space tend to be the point of departure.
Franz von Benda-Beckmann & Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, Places That Come
and Go: A Legal Anthropological Perspective on the Temporalities of Space in
Plural Legal Orders, in EXPANDING SPACES OF LAW, supra note 54, at 30, 32
(footnote omitted).
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consumer expectations. In doing so, we can be put in a better
position to locate geographically related factors to “question,
critique, and hopefully rewrite spatial assumptions that are built
into” intellectual property law and policy.349
B. Legalizing Space
Apart from closely examining the spatial assumptions that
have been built into intellectual property law and policy, it will be
worthwhile to think more deeply about the different legal tools and
devices that can be introduced to address problems lying at the
intersection of intellectual property and geography. These tools
and devices could also help provide what Andreas
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos has referred to as “spatial justice.”350
Although this Subpart returns to the three sets of issues explored
in Part IV, it only separates those occurring inside the border from
those occurring across and beyond the border. After all, the legal
solutions to problems occurring across and beyond the border tend
to overlap somewhat.
1. Inside the Border
Although Subpart IV.A begins with the usual critique of the
“one size fits all” or “supersize fits all” approach to intellectual
property normsetting within the international community, it goes
further to call for these critiques to be extended to the “one size fits
all” approach to intellectual property normsetting within an
individual country. If this approach is to be avoided, differentiated
intellectual property standards will have to be developed at the
subnational level.
A proposal calling for the development of subnational
standards will inevitably raise concerns about potential
inconsistencies with the TRIPS Agreement. As much as
policymakers and commentators have noted how globalization,
349. Carmalt, supra note 327, at 149.
350. See Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Law’s Spatial Turn:
Geography, Justice and a Certain Fear of Space, 7 LAW, CULTURE & HUMAN. 187,
196–202 (2010) (discussing spatial justice).
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trade liberalization, and regional agreements have weakened the
nation-state concept, this concept still remains the foundation of
the WTO system. Except for a few customs territories, such as
Chinese Taipei,351 Hong Kong, and Macao, all the 160-plus WTO
members are nation-states.352
Furthermore, as far as patentable inventions are concerned,
Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement states that “patents shall be
available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to
the place of invention, the field of technology and whether products
are imported or locally produced.”353 Although most of the
discussions on this provision have focused on discrimination based
on either the field of technology or the distinction between product
and process patents, this provision includes an express prohibition
against discrimination based on “the place of invention.”354
Upon reflection, however, the analysis is likely to be less
straightforward, especially when the region-based differentiated
arrangements respect national treatment—that is, when they do
not discriminate against foreign patent holders.355 Indeed, one
could offer three arguably strong arguments to support greater
tailoring of intellectual property standards to the divergent
economic and technological conditions at the subnational level.
First, if the proposed arrangements offer the same protection
to all inventions within the region, regardless of “the place of
invention, the field of technology and whether products are
imported or locally produced,”356 they should not present any
Article 27.1 problem. Moreover, the WTO panel made clear in
Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products357 that
351. Chinese Taipei is formally called the “Separate Customs Territory of
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu.” Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan,
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese Taipei) and the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/chinese_taipei_e.htm
(last
visited Nov. 23, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
352. See
Members
and
Observers,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited
Nov. 23, 2017) (listing the WTO members) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
353. TRIPS Agreement, art. 27.1.
354. Id.
355. See id. art. 3 (requiring the national treatment of foreign rights holders).
356. Id. art. 27.1.
357. See generally Panel Report, Canada—Patent Protection of
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“differentiation” does not always amount to “discrimination.”358 As
the panel observed,
The primary TRIPS provisions that deal with discrimination,
such as the national treatment and most-favoured-nation
provisions of Articles 3 and 4, do not use the term
“discrimination”. They speak in more precise terms. The
ordinary meaning of the word “discriminate” is potentially
broader than these more specific definitions. It certainly
extends beyond the concept of differential treatment. It is a
normative term, pejorative in connotation, referring to results
of the unjustified imposition of differentially disadvantageous
treatment.359

During the panel process concerning this dispute, the United
States made a third-party intervention stating that “differential
treatment did not necessarily mean discriminatory treatment
because different technologies might require different treatment to
restore ‘parity of enjoyment.’”360 Cited as support for its position is
the technology-specific Bolar exception,361 which already existed
during the TRIPS negotiations and applied to only
pharmaceuticals and, later, medical devices.362 Similarly,
Australia, another third-party intervener, “stated that differential
treatment did not necessarily amount to discrimination,
and . . . cited patent term extension as a means of ‘restoring the
balance of interests.’”363
Pharmaceutical Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS114/R (adopted in Mar. 17, 2000)
[hereinafter WTO Panel Report].
358. Id. ¶ 7.94.
359. Id.
360. Id. ¶ 4.36.
361. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000))
(creating the Bolar exception); see also COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS,
INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: REPORT
50 (2002),
OF THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/ciprfullfinal.pdf
(discussing the importance of the Bolar exception, which “makes it legal for a
generic producer to import, manufacture and test a patented product prior to the
expiry of the patent in order that it may fulfill the regulatory requirements
imposed by particular countries as necessary for marketing as a generic”).
362. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669–74 (1990)
(extending the Bolar exception to medical devices—namely, implantable cardiac
defibrillators).
363. WTO Panel Report, supra note 357, ¶ 4.36.
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Second, although countries tend to have national standards on
the books, a geographical examination of the actual protection on
the ground shows varying levels of protection throughout many of
these countries. In the United States, for instance, courts in
different appellate circuits continue to disagree over the protection
of intellectual property rights, resulting in what is generally
referred to as “circuit splits.”364 A case in point is the protection
offered by national trademark and unfair competition laws.
Although the standards may be the same on paper—that is, based
on the federal Lanham Act365—they differ at times in reality, not
to mention the different levels of protection offered by state unfair
competition laws.366
Finally, there is a growing trend for developing countries to
establish “free trade zones,” “customs free zones,” or “export
processing free zones.”367 These free zones tend to offer “relaxed
regulations, limited taxes[,] . . . reduced oversight . . . [and]
softened Customs control”—features that are different from those
in other parts of the country.368 Although intellectual property
364. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property Litigation:
A Vehicle for Resurgent Comparativist Thought, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 429, 430 (2001)
The United States is a large and diverse country comprising many
autonomous political sub-units that enjoy adjudicatory and
prescriptive authority. As commerce, culture, and communication
became more national in nature, conflicts between different states
within the United States were sufficiently plentiful to provide grist for
the mills of both courts and conflicts scholars.
365. Lanham Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n (2012).
366. See Peter S. Menell, Regulating “Spyware”: The Limitations of State
“Laboratories” and the Case for Federal Preemption of State Unfair Competition
Laws, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1363, 1380–95 (2005) (discussing the landscape of
federal and state unfair competition laws in the United States).
367. See Susan Tiefenbrun, U.S. Foreign Trade Zones, Tax-Free Trade Zones
of the World, and Their Impact on the U.S Economy, 12 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 149,
167–80 (2013) (comparing the foreign free trade zones in the United States with
those in other parts of the world).
368. BUS. ACTION TO STOP COUNTERFEITING & PIRACY, INT’L CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, CONTROLLING THE ZONE: BALANCING FACILITATION AND CONTROL TO
COMBAT ILLICIT TRADE IN THE WORLD’S FREE TRADE ZONES 1 (2013),
https://cdn.iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2016/11/Combating-illicit-trade-inFTZs-1.pdf. As Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, and
Anne Griffiths observed,
Law is . . . used for creating spaces for more specific purposes with
special legal regimes that are superimposed on this general
geographical political and administrative grid, such as economic
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industries remain concerned about the problem of piracy and
counterfeiting brought about by these free zones and sought to
push for higher standards such as those in the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement,369 the existence of these free zones within the
WTO framework does suggest that WTO rules may allow for
differentiation in limited circumstances.
In sum, although the analysis in this Section is admittedly
preliminary by nature, it illustrates the benefits of greater
geographical insights and spatial analysis. The discussion here
also invites us to think more deeply about the possibility of
redesigning the intellectual property system in a way that better
responds to the uneven economic and technological developments
within a country. Because this type of uneven development is
found more often in large developing countries than in their
developed counterparts, it is very likely that new innovative
solutions will come from the former rather than the latter.370
Having solutions emerging from developing countries is both
exciting and refreshing. After all, the transplant of intellectual
property standards tends to go in the opposite direction—from
developed to developing countries.371
zones . . . . Within one legal system there may be a multiplicity of
different constructions of legally relevant space that may coexist and
compete . . . . The measure of abstraction largely depends on the
consequences lawmakers aim at when selecting specific characteristics
while abstracting from and leaving other characteristics legally
irrelevant.
Franz von Benda-Beckmann et al., Space and Legal Pluralism: An Introduction,
in SPATIALIZING LAW, supra note 59, at 1, 5–6.
369. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened for signature May 1, 2011,
50 I.L.M. 243. For the Author’s discussion of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement, see generally Peter K. Yu, ACTA and Its Complex Politics, 3 WIPO J.
1 (2011); Peter K. Yu, The ACTA Committee, in THE ACTA AND THE PLURILATERAL
ENFORCEMENT AGENDA: GENESIS AND AFTERMATH 143 (Pedro Roffe & Xavier Seuba
eds., 2014); Yu, supra note 205; Yu, Alphabet Soup, supra note 88, at 18–24; Peter
K. Yu, Enforcement, Enforcement, What Enforcement?, 52 IDEA 239 (2012); Yu,
supra note 169.
370. See Yu, Intellectual Property and Asian Values, supra note 221, at 396
(“Given the complexity of the various economies in Chindiasean [China, India,
and ASEAN], the group may be able to draw on their own experience and
problems to develop solutions that address the uneven development problems.”).
371. See generally Paul E. Geller, Legal Transplants in International
Copyright: Some Problems of Method, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 199 (1994)
(discussing legal transplant in the international copyright area); Peter K. Yu, Can
the Canadian UGC Exception Be Transplanted Abroad?, 26 INTELL. PROP. J. 175
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2. Across and Beyond the Border

Subpart IV.B focuses on the protection of traditional
knowledge and traditional cultural expressions. It shows that even
if we could all agree that traditional communities should decide for
themselves what to protect and how to protect, difficult questions
would still arise when the dispute involved more than one
traditional community. When this dispute involved several
communities both inside and outside a country, new legal solutions
would have to be developed.
Subpart IV.C examines the challenges posed by the
intellectual property rights holders’ use of legal and technological
tools—and often, “technolegal” tools372—to protect assets and
facilitate exploitation. While the rights holders’ eagerness to
protect intellectual property is easy to understand, the eventual
outcomes, such as those involving region-based restrictions, do not
always make sense in terms of political, economic, social, or
cultural geography.
When Subparts IV.B and IV.C are taken together, the two sets
of issues discussed call for the development of new legal tools and
devices. This Section offers three suggestions.
The first suggestion is to establish a transborder trust, which
enables countries or communities to share the responsibility for
and the benefits of their shared cultural heritage. This suggestion
draws inspiration from the “international cultural property trust”
that commentators have proposed to address the problem in Peru
v. Johnson,373 a case involving pre-Columbian artifacts seized by
the United States Customs Service, of which the Government of
(2014) (exploring the feasibility of transplanting the Canadian copyright
exception for user-generated content abroad); Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright
Reform and Legal Transplants in Hong Kong, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 693 (2010)
(discussing efforts to transplant digital copyright laws to Hong Kong from
abroad); Peter K. Yu, The Transplant and Transformation of Intellectual Property
Laws in China, in GOVERNANCE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA AND
EUROPE 20 (Nari Lee et al. eds., 2016) (discussing the transplant of intellectual
property laws in China from Western developed countries).
372. See Yu, supra note 37, at 939 (“The protection offered by these self-help
measures is not only legal or technological per se, but constitutes a combination
of both—which I have described as the technolegal. While technology helps
reinforce or supplement the existing legal protection, law further prohibits the
circumvention of technology.” (footnote omitted)).
373. 720 F. Supp. 810 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
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Peru claimed to be the legal owner.374 In that case, the court
rejected Peru’s claims based on the fact that the contested artifacts
could also be identified with those found in either Bolivia or
Ecuador.375 To remedy this identification problem, the proposed
transborder trust aims to eliminate the geographical border. This
type of trust could be especially valuable in areas where
benefit-sharing is mandated by international agreements, such as
the Convention on Biological Diversity376 and the Nagoya Protocol
on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing
of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to the Convention on
Biological Diversity.377
The second suggestion covers efforts to shape norms that
would apply extraterritorially to cover the entire dispute at issue.
Even better, these norms are designed in a way that would be
recognized by all the jurisdictions involved—for example, through
the skillful use of choice-of-law principles.378 If such recognition is
possible, the courts at issue may even be able to draw on existing
legal concepts, such as concurrent ownership, joint authorship,
and derivative works.379 The use of these concepts is attractive
374. Id. at 811.
375. See id. at 812 (stating that the Government of Peru “ha[d] no direct
evidence that any of the subject items came from Peru,” as opposed to the two
other countries).
376. See Convention on Biological Diversity art. 8(j), June 5, 1992, 1760
U.N.T.S. 79 (requiring member states to “encourage the equitable sharing of the
benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge, innovations and
practices”).
377. See UNITED NATIONS, NAGOYA PROTOCOL ON ACCESS TO GENETIC
RESOURCES AND THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE SHARING OF BENEFITS ARISING FROM
THEIR UTILIZATION TO THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 4 (2010),
http://www.cbd.int/abs/doc/protocol/nagoya-protocol-en.pdf
The objective of this Protocol is the fair and equitable sharing of the
benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources, including by
appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of
relevant technologies, taking into account all rights over those
resources and to technologies, and by appropriate funding, thereby
contributing to the conservation of biological diversity and the
sustainable use of its components.
378. See Yu, Towards Seamless Global Distribution, supra note 140, at 204–
06 (discussing the use of choice-of-law principles); see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie,
A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create Global Norms, 149
U. PA. L. REV. 469, 476 (2000) (calling for courts to “decide international copyright
cases not by choosing an applicable law, but by devising an applicable solution”).
379. See SCAFIDI, supra note 266, at 161–62 (discussing concurrent ownership

2130

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2045 (2017)

because they have already been widely used in the intellectual
property field.380 Such use will therefore promote certainty and
predictability.
The third suggestion relates to the development of new modes
of protection that provide recognition across or beyond the
border.381 Examples of protections that go across the border are
those facilitated by regional initiatives, such as the European
Union trade mark, the community design system, and the
European Union’s unitary patent system.382 For illustrative
purposes, the European Union trade mark came into existence as
the Community trade mark following the adoption of the Council
Regulation on the Community Trade Mark383 in December 1993
and the establishment of the Office for Harmonization in the
Internal Market (now the European Union Intellectual Property
Office).384 Instead of having national trademarks in the then
twelve, and now twenty-eight, members of the European Union,385

of property). The concept of joint authorship could nevertheless present some
problems. As Silke von Lewinski stated, “[b]ecause of the lack of individual
authorship in expressions of folklore, applying the concept of co-authorship does
not remedy the situation, because co-authors are still individual authors who
have decided to create a work together and according to a common plan.” Silke
von Lewinski, The Protection of Folklore, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 747, 758
(2003).
380. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2012) (allowing for concurrent registration of
trademarks); 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (providing for the right “to prepare derivative
works based upon the copyrighted work”); id. § 201(a) (“The authors of a joint
work are coowners of copyright in the work.”); 35 U.S.C. § 116 (“When an
invention is made by two or more persons jointly, they shall apply for patent
jointly . . . .”).
381. See von Benda-Beckmann et al., supra note 368, at 5 (“[S]paces extending
beyond state boundaries may acquire legal validity through multinational
agreements created by transnational entities, such as the European Union.”).
382. See Yu, Towards Seamless Global Distribution, supra note 140, at 200–
01 (discussing these regional initiatives).
383. Council Regulation 40/941 of 20 December 1993 on the Community
Trade Mark, 1994 O.J. (L 11) 1 (EC) [hereinafter Council Regulation 40/941].
384. See
The
Office,
EUR.
UNION
INTELL.
PROP.
OFF.,
https://euipo.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/the-office (last updated June 27, 2016) (last
visited Nov. 23, 2017) (describing the European Union Intellectual Property
Office) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
385. See Countries, EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/abouteu/countries_en (last visited Nov. 23, 2017) (providing a list of EU members) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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rights holders enjoy the protection of a single region-wide unitary
trademark throughout the European Union.386
Examples of those protections that go beyond the border are
those found at the global level.387 Although commentators have
explored the need for unitary global protection,388 such protection
has yet to exist in the intellectual property field. Nevertheless, the
“cross-border exchange” mechanism facilitated by the recently
adopted Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works
for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print
Disabled389 has paved the way for such protection. Article 5(1)
specifically allows an accessible format copy made under the
permitted conditions in one country to be distributed or made
available under similar conditions in another.390 Even though the
arrangement is not universal, the cross-border exchange could
make these accessible format copies widely available at the global
level.
In sum, there are a wide variety of legal tools and devices that
could be used to address the intellectual property challenges lying
across and beyond the border. How well these tools and devices
respond to the geographical challenges will depend on whether
they can fully address the geographical complexities involved.
386. See Council Regulation 40/941, supra note 383, art. 1(2) (“A Community
trade mark [now a European Union trade mark] shall have a unitary character.
It shall have equal effect throughout the Community . . . .”).
387. See von Benda-Beckmann et al., supra note 368, at 5 (“[F]or some types
of law, such as human rights law, global or cosmopolitan validity is claimed, while
traditional legal and regional legal orders often define the validity of their law
independently from any spatial demarcation, as is the case, for instance, with
Islamic law.”).
388. See generally John H. Barton, Issues Posed by a World Patent System, 7
J. INT’L ECON. L. 341 (2004) (discussing the standards appropriate to a reasonable
global patent, taking the developing country perspective); Yu, Seamless Global
Digital Marketplace, supra note 140, at 277–89 (calling for the establishment of
“a seamless global digital marketplace” of media and entertainment content).
389. Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons
Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled, June 27, 2013, 52
I.L.M. 1312. This treaty provides individuals with print disabilities with easy or
ready access to copyright publications.
390. See id. art. 5(1) (“Contracting Parties shall provide that if an accessible
format copy is made under a limitation or exception or pursuant to operation of
law, that accessible format copy may be distributed or made available by an
authorized entity to a beneficiary person or an authorized entity in another
Contracting Party.”).

2132

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2045 (2017)
VI. Conclusion

Spatial analysis and critique is not yet a common approach to
assessing the strengths and weaknesses of intellectual property
laws and policies. Yet, the discussion of geographical indications,
traditional knowledge, traditional cultural expressions, climate
change, high-technology innovation clusters, regional and
plurilateral trade agreements, cloud-based distribution platforms,
geolocation tools, and GPS navigation have raised important
questions that would require a deeper and more thorough
understanding of geography and the interrelationship between
intellectual property and geography.
Although it is too early to tell whether a theoretical or
“methodological turn” toward greater geographical understanding
and spatial analysis of intellectual property law and policy will
eventually emerge,391 it is my hope that the spatial critique
provided in this Article will promote a deeper appreciation of the
connections between intellectual property and geography. This
Article also seeks to provide the much-needed groundwork for a
two-way dialogue between these two undeniably connected fields.

391. See Irus Braverman, Who’s Afraid of Methodology: Advocating a
Methodological Turn in Legal Geography, in EXPANDING SPACES OF LAW, supra
note 54, at 120 (alluding to the “methodological turn”); see also
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, supra note 350, 196–202 (criticizing the current
literature on law and geography for under-theorizing the concept of space);
Mariana Valverde, “Time Thickens, Takes on Flesh”: Spatiotemporal Dynamics in
Law, in EXPANDING SPACES OF LAW, supra note 54, at 53, 56 (discussing the
“spatial turn in sociolegal studies”).

